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Abstract 
 
The study investigated what the degree of political accountability is in water 
projects as practiced by project implementers.  The evaluation was also aimed 
at determining the impact of political accountability on project sustainability.  In 
order to evaluate the question, field research was conducted.  Field research 
was of a quantitative nature, using a questionnaire. This involved (a) selecting 
two systems (project implementers, a municipality and a non-governmental 
organisation) where the systems’ political accountability within water projects 
could be compared, and (b) interviewing community respondents from a set 
questionnaire in four villages.  The main findings are that (i) the level of 
political accountability in water projects depends on the system implementing 
a water project, (ii) three elements of political accountability (responsibility, 
information, and inclusion) differ significantly between the two systems, and 
(iii) political accountability has a significant impact on project sustainability.  It 
is recommended that project implementers take into consideration the 
identified three elements of political accountability in order to improve project 
sustainability.  
 iv
Opsomming 
 
Die volgende studie het die graad van verantwoordbaarheid in water projekte 
ondersoek.  Die impak van politieke verantwoordbaarheid op projek 
volhoubaarheid is ook ondersoek.  Veldnavorsing is gebruik om die 
navorsingsvraag te beantwoord.  Navorsing was van ‘n kwantitatiewe aard 
(vraelyste).  Navorsing het (a) die selektering van twee stelsels (nie-
regeringsorganisasie en munisipaliteit) waardeur die politieke verantwoording 
van elk van die stelsels vergelyk is, en (b) onderhoudvoering met 
gemeenskapsrespondente vanaf ‘n vraelys in vier geselekteerde plattelandse 
dorpies, behels.  Die hoofbevindinge is (i) die graad van politieke 
verantwoording in ‘n water projek is afhanklik van die projek implementeerder, 
(ii) drie elemente van politieke verantwoordbaarheid verskil betekenisvol 
tussen die twee stelsels (projek implementeerders), en (iii) politieke 
verantwoordbaarheid het ‘n betekenisvolle impak op projek volhoubaarheid.  
Daar word voorgestel dat projek implementeerders die posisie van die drie 
geidentifiseerde elemente (verantwoordelikheid, inligting, en insluiting) binne 
elke stelsel in ag neem om sodoende projek volhoubaarheid te bevorder.  
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Glossary 
 
The following terms are used within the study and needs clarification: 
 
Water project – a water provision project, at village level, which can provide water through 
in-house connections, standpipes every 200 metres, a borehole, and/or a water reservoir. 
 
Project implementer – a governmental or non-governmental institution authorised to 
implement the abovementioned water projects. 
 
Project beneficiary – a person within a village who is the target beneficiary of a water 
project. 
 
Community – members of a village where a water project has been implemented; the 
community can therefore also be described as project beneficiaries. 
 
Water committee – a committee, established by the community, closely involved with all 
matter dealing with water provision in the specific village. 
 
Community meeting – a meeting that can be called by a project implementer, through the 
village chief, or by the chief in order to discuss matters (social, economic, political, or 
other) believed to have a direct bearing on the village.  
 
Project sustainability – a water project that remains functioning for a long time after the 
project implementer has established the project. 
 
Mopani district – the geographical location within which the two key water projects are 
located. 
 
 xiii
Standpipe – a watertap built either within a household yard or outside the yard, acting as 
a communal tap. 
 
Political accountability - the essential elements of political accountability are 
responsibility, information, inclusion, sanctioning, and credibility (please see the 
literature study for a more detailed discussion). 
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I lie down and sleep; 
I wake again, because the Lord sustains me. 
Psalm 3:5 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 1996 a new Constitution was introduced in South Africa.  A new constitution was 
necessary to establish democracy and address past practices within the country.  One 
effect the Constitution brought is changes in the structure and operation of local 
government (Smith and Hanson 2003:1517,1518).  This has taken place in order for 
local government to (a) provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities; (b) ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner; (c) promote social and economic development; (d) promote a safe and 
healthy environment; and (e) encourage the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in the matters of local government (RSA 1996, section 152). 
 
Although the Constitution highlights that government should be accountable it is 
difficult to know for certain whether this decision-maker is being accountable.  One can 
hope that, in general, a decision-maker is accountable.  But what are the requirements 
for accountability?  Can a decision-maker meet only one requirement and still be 
regarded as accountable?  Also, is there a difference between a government institution 
and a non-governmental organization with regards to the degree of political 
accountability practiced by each actor? 
 
The following study evaluates what political accountability should, ideally, incorporate.  
This evaluation revealed that there are not many studies focused on detailed 
description of political accountability, and specifically, measurement of political 
accountability.  It was also found that precise definition of what accountability entails is 
rarely provided in documents. Inadequate provision of a precise definition has two 
major outcomes.  One result is that persons within a government institution or NGO 
have little guidance in how to implement accountability.  The second result is that the 
public finds it difficult to evaluate whether the actions and behaviour of the government 
institution are accountable. 
 
A water project in a community/village becomes an ideal method in which to evaluate 
whether a decision-maker on a local level acts in a manner that can be described as 
politically accountable.  A water project at local level is, arguably, a smaller ‘object’ that 
can be influenced by citizens, compared to influencing a national ‘object’ like, for 
example, revising the electoral system.  In a water project a process is followed which 
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can be observed by citizens going to benefit from such a project.  Because the project 
follows a process, there is, probably, opportunity for citizens/community members to 
influence decision-making.  Community members are, furthermore, in a position to 
evaluate how a project decision-maker/implementer establishes the water project.  
Laban’s (2007) study considers accountability and rights in local water governance.  
His study indicates that both decision-makers as well as beneficiaries need to be 
accountable in local water governance in order for this resource to be utilised in a 
sustainable manner. 
 
The ability to influence and evaluate decisions and behaviour of a decision-maker is 
essential in the practice of political accountability.  It implies that (a) during a project, 
citizens are able to influence decision-makers via participatory measures and (b) 
during a project and after a project is completed, citizens are able to evaluate firstly, 
the project outcome and secondly, the participation of the decision-maker in the 
project. 
 
Water projects, therefore, serve as a means of evaluating political accountability as 
practiced by government as well as non-governmental institutions involved in water 
provision.  Approaching the evaluation of political accountability within the context of 
water provision has an added benefit for the study: it can be evaluated whether 
political accountability has an impact on the outcome of a project (or, the sustainability 
of a project).  The research question that will be investigated is: 
 
Is there any political accountability in water projects and does political 
accountability impact project sustainability? 
 
In order to measure political accountability in water projects, four projects were 
selected in the northern region of South Africa.  Similar to the rest of South Africa, the 
region is regarded as a low-rainfall area.  Water access is therefore already of critical 
importance within the region.  At the same time, it was obvious that water 
infrastructure within a village does not guarantee that water is provided to a community 
supposed to benefit from this infrastructure.  From the research question it is evident 
that the study aims to determine whether political accountability in water projects 
would contribute to project sustainability, thereby ensuring water access to 
communities within a low-rainfall region. 
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Six chapters are presented for this study in order to address the research question.  
First, the introduction has highlighted that there are not many studies that provides 
evaluation of political accountability.  The importance of the following study lies in its 
evaluation and measurement of political accountability in a real-life issue. 
 
Second, the literature review focused on political accountability and what the concept 
entails.  The literature considers (a) what other authors believe political accountability 
entails and (b) a section discussing which elements this study will employ in order to 
measure political accountability.  In the literature study attention is also paid to a list of 
responsibilities as stated by two project implementers.  This list of responsibilities 
serves as a valuable element within the questionnaire measuring political 
accountability in water projects.   
 
Third, the context in which political accountability will be study is provided.  This 
includes considering the water situation of the geographical area where the field 
research was undertaken; village demographics in which the selected water projects 
were established; and the importance attached to political accountability by two project 
implementers.  This chapter also provides a more detailed rationale for the study. 
 
Fourth, the methodology for the study is provided. In short, the methodology includes 
designing a questionnaire measuring political accountability in community-level water 
projects.  Statistical methods utilised to analyse the data are also provided.   
 
Thereafter the data analysis gathered through the field research is provided.  In this 
chapter the findings of the data are presented.  Data analyses include (a) presenting 
frequency graphs of selected variables believed to provide a reliable overview of the 
data (b) exploratory analysis of the data (c) discussing variables in the questionnaire in 
great detail (d), comparing the four water projects throughout the chapter and (e) 
presenting an overall analysis of the data which summarises key findings. 
 
Lastly, chapter 6, the conclusion summarises the main findings of the study and 
discusses the contribution of this study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Study 
 
2.  Literature Study 
The chapter is divided into three sections.  In this first section, other studies’ contribution 
towards an understanding of political accountability is highlighted.  A number of these 
studies do not address essential areas of political accountability and as such creates the 
space for a new study of accountability.  The second section places political 
accountability within the context of democracy and good governance.  This context is 
important when considering the concept within the South African environment.  The last 
section is valuable since it provides an understanding of what political accountability 
should ideally focus on.  In this section elements of political accountability are identified.  
These elements form the basis for the measurement of accountability in this study. 
 
2.1  Unpacking the concept ‘political accountability’ 
Political accountability is a concept that does not appear to have a “watertight” definition.  
Accountability acquires a variety of meanings depending on the actor using it as well as 
the context in which it is being used1.  It is essential to clarify the meaning ascribed to 
accountability in order to prevent confusion when linking this concept to water projects. 
   
A general observation is that accountability takes place through another concept, such as 
stakeholder participation.  It is not a concept that is visible on its own.  Political 
accountability is, furthermore, usually discussed within the context of, for example, 
executive-legislative relationships, electorate-political representative relationships, or 
bureaucracy-elected official relationships (Allan 2001; Dunn 1999).  As a result, 
discussions about political accountability reflect these contexts and rarely look at 
everyday accountability, as “exercised” in, for example, water projects. 
 
In essence, political accountability implies that actor A gives account to actor B for its 
actions and decisions towards actor B.  This involves that actor A provides explanation 
and justification for its decisions and actions.   
 
There are different “directions” of political accountability within an accountability 
relationship.  The different directions indicate who is/should be accountable to whom.  
                                            
1 For example, when accountability is used within the context of the financial world, it refers to 
accountability within the budgeting process of an institution and not necessarily to social accountability 
towards stakeholders. 
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These directions indicate an accountability relationship between different actors (see 
figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Directions of accountability 
                          Superiors                                                                 
                                                                     ↕ (a) 
 Relationships (c) ↔       Decision-maker              
        on the level of 
      the decision-maker                                 ↕ (b) 
                        Stakeholder 
 
These directions are explained by Barker’s (2001:138) overview of different forms of 
accountability.  Barker identifies: 
(a)  Upwards accountability – accountability towards a controlling authority which I 
term superiors; 
(b)  Downwards/explanatory accountability – a less formally based accountability that 
offers open explanation and a chance to raise questions and criticisms; 
(c)  Outwards accountability – “whereby a public body or office-holder offers and 
receives mutual accountability to and from other relevant players in the public (and 
even the private) sector, to form a network of open, discursive relationships aimed at 
tackling public policy problems”; in short I refer to this as the relationship between the 
decision-maker and colleagues although these colleagues need not be from the same 
institution as the decision-maker; 
(d)  Ex-ante accountability – “an elaborate planning enquiry into a proposed…project”; 
and 
(e)  Ex-post accountability – “accountability and responsibility in policy choices…to 
help protect [against]…accidents or policy failures” (Barker 2001:138). 
 
This overview indicates that political accountability is ensured through relationships 
between different actors.  One can distinguish that accountability is a two-way 
process.  There are certain measures that need to be practised by the project 
implementer.  As will be later discussed, these measures include fulfilling specified 
responsibilities and fostering participation.  At the same time, superiors, colleagues, 
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and stakeholders need to employ other measures in order to complete the 
accountability process.  This includes using the sanctioning device. 
 
The basic definition provided for political accountability is useful.  However, once the 
concept needs to be measured, it becomes apparent that there needs to be elements 
which can be measured in order to determine whether actor A has acted accountably 
towards actor B.  Political accountability, therefore, consists of a number of elements.  
These elements will be highlighted in this chapter. 
 
In a number of laws as well as in documents referring to service delivery, mention is 
made of the need for an institution to be accountable to stakeholders.  The reason 
stated usually refers to accountability being important for monitoring an institution’s 
operations.   The essential role of political accountability is therefore established in 
these documents.  Despite the concept’s perceived importance there is rarely, if at all, 
methods highlighted in which an institution’s political accountability can be measured.  
Arguably, this can be resolved by considering what academics write about the concept 
and its measurement.  Section 2.2 highlights a number of areas that writers believe the 
concept entails.  However, as highlighted in the section, these areas do not 
necessarily provide an adequate description of political accountability.  Measurement 
of the concept becomes challenging. 
 
In order to use Barker’s framework as well as determine measurement of the concept one 
needs to know what exactly political accountability entails.  The following section 
considers how political accountability is promoted/ensured. 
 
 
2.2  Selected studies’ contribution towards understanding political accountability 
A number of studies contributed to the focus of this study.  All these studies agree on 
the necessity of accountability within democratic practice.  This section highlights that 
studies about political accountability have focused on aspects of the concept.  These 
studies do not necessarily highlight that accountability is ensured, only, when a 
number of aspects are pursued in unity.   
The following section highlight that a number of studies on political accountability (a) 
see accountability as a sanctioning device, (b) focus on elections as sufficient to 
ensure political accountability, (c) focus on national-level comparisons instead of 
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evaluating the practice of accountability by organisations, (d) link outcomes of political 
accountability to a healthy political culture and not necessarily tangible outcomes for 
people, and (e) at times, evaluate accountability within a variety of contexts 
simultaneously, instead of focusing on one area and reaching detailed conclusions 
about political accountability in that one area.  
 
2.2.1  Viewing accountability as a sanctioning device 
Accountability is commonly viewed as a means of sanctioning one actor when it has 
not fulfilled certain obligations towards another actor (Fearon 1999:55,56; Dunn 1999; 
Laver and Shepsle 1999:279-296; Dunn 1999a:329-336; Barker 2001:132-140; 
Cheibub and Przeworski 1999; 232; Fearon 1999:55,56; Mathur and Skelcher 2004:4; 
Rubenstein 2007:616,617; Montesquieu 1989[1748]:xi,4 as amended by Dunn 
1999a:336; Zhao 2007:64-73; Cloete 1996:20). 
 
Accountability as a sanctioning device presents an opportunity to punish or penalise 
people who are acting contrary to what they are supposed.  It is focused on the 
relationship between one actor towards another (specifically considering whether one 
actor acts in the interest of another), thereby ensuring accountability (Fearon 
1999:55,56; Dunn 1999:297-300; Laver and Shepsle 1999:279-282,294,295; Dunn 
1999a:329-336; Barker 2001:133,137-140; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:225,232; 
Fearon 1999:55,56; Mathur and Skelcher 2004:4; Rubenstein 2007:616,617; 
Montesquieu 1989[1748]:xi,4 as amended by Dunn 1999a:336; Zhao 2007:64-73).  
Cloete (1996:20) states that accountability should be more than answerability/giving 
an explanation.  “Accountability should be enforced by purposeful control, punishment 
for wrongdoing, and compensation for the persons or parties prejudiced by the 
wrongdoing” (Cloete 1996:20).  
 
In this way, accountability is seen as a legal device, used by one actor, to sanction (or 
control) the actions and behaviour of another actor.  It is a device that is relevant in 
democracies as well as non-democracies2.   
 
In the “traditional” sense of using accountability as a sanctioning device, accountability 
means that the public can punish or penalise rulers when these rulers do not fulfil their 
                                            
2 This is because all forms of ruling have a system/hierarchy of authority that needs to be limited 
(through measures of accountability).   
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duties to the public.  Zhao (2007:64-73), however, highlights that rulers can also use 
this mechanism in order to evaluate public performance and then reward or punish the 
public accordingly3.  This study clearly highlights that when accountability is viewed, 
purely, as a sanctioning device, it can easily be limited to a mechanism of extreme 
control over another actor. 
 
Crook and Manor (1998:298) highlight that “softer” sanctioning measures are sometimes 
more beneficial to ensure accountability.  One such “soft” measure is the role that 
committee systems play.  Committee systems are able to facilitate improved engagement 
and inclusion of the public in decision-making.  Through these actions, committee 
systems serve as vehicles for monitoring or sanctioning government actions and 
decisions. 
  
Accountability, certainly, needs to include sanctioning within its operation.  However, 
studies viewing accountability’s most important role as being a sanctioning device 
sometimes neglect to consider whether this device will be effective in making an 
impact on the system of a country or institution.   
 
2.2.2  Viewing elections as sufficient to ensure accountability 
One of the end-objectives a number of authors argue is that accountability is a device 
to compel one actor to be responsive to the interests and needs of another actor 
(Mathur and Skelcher 2004:4,5; Nelson 2007:79-97; Metagora 2007; Dunn 
1999:131,299; Laver and Shepsle 1999:279; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:225).   
 
A familiar mechanism believed to compel one actor to be responsive to the interests 
and needs of another, is elections (Bruch et al 2005 in Ashton 2007:86; Fearon 
1999:56; Dunn 1999:298,299; Dunn 1999a:342,343; Stimson 1999:198; Barker 
2001:132; Dunn 1999:298; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:232; Crook and Manor 
1998:233,290-299). 
 
Despite a general belief that elections (as an accountability device) will compel a 
political actor to be responsive to the interests and needs of the public, Nelson 
                                            
3 Zhao Shukai (2007) presents a study about Chinese township accountability.  Chinese (rural) 
townships are required by government to fulfil certain targets, which include economic, social, and 
political targets.  If these targets are not reached by a township/village the township is penalised. 
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(2007:80-83) argues that findings suggest that elections are unlikely to positively 
influence social sector outcomes, such as increased welfare spending or service 
delivery outcomes. 
 
It should also be noted that although elections is viewed as a mechanism to ensure 
political accountability, a number of studies argue that, on its own, elections are 
insufficient to ensure accountability (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:232,237,239; 
Fearon 1999:57,68,69; Stimson 1999:199; Crook and Manor 1998:294; Laver and 
Shepsle 1999:294; Dunn 1999:299).   
 
Elections can only serve as an accountability mechanism during election times, which 
is periodic.  It is not necessarily that public interests and needs are addressed once a 
party has been elected as government.  Elections, furthermore, do not necessarily 
hold leaders accountable.  Instead, fellow politicians may serve as a more likely 
means to hold leaders accountable (Stimson 1999:199; Cheibub and Przeworski 
1999:232,237,239; Bruch et al in Ashton 2007:86).  It is obvious that accountability 
needs to be ensured between elections as well. 
 
2.2.3  Focusing on national-level comparisons 
The range of accountability studies is another aspect that needs further attention.  
Mathur and Skelcher (2004:2,5) highlight that studies about democratic performance4 
are, largely, focused on national-level comparisons of whole democratic systems (or 
formal constitutional structures).  Little attention is given to the measurement of “the 
underlying discourses and associated practices that take place in and around the 
formal constitution5” (Mathur and Skelcher 2004:2).   
 
Measuring the level of accountability in a whole democratic system is very beneficial to 
get an impression of where the particular country is heading within the context of 
governance.  However, as Mathur and Skelcher (2004) highlight, the practices taking 
place “in and around the formal constitution” requires attention.  In this sense, a study 
about accountability needs to include methods of measuring how democracy is 
practised at all levels in a country.  These areas can be viewed as the political 
                                            
4 Accountability forms part of the overall democratic performance within a country or organisation. 
5 Colm, Allan 2001 (commentary about executive-legislative-judiciary relationships); Dunn 1999a; Barker 
2001; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999; Fearon 1999; Ferejohn 1999:134; Laver and Shepsle 1999:279-
285; Stimson 1999 
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“muscles” of a country.  The constitution provides the structure (or skeleton); but it is 
the muscles’ functioning that makes the skeleton move in a certain way.  If 
accountability is not completely ingrained at the “practising” level, it is unlikely that 
constitutional provisions will be able to ensure accountability on a national scale. 
 
2.2.4  Accountability, a healthy political culture, and considering accountability in just one   
given area 
Two studies that made a large impact on the focus of the study are the studies from 
Rubenstein (2007) and Laban (2007).  Rubenstein (2007:616-632) highlights that it is 
difficult, at times, to ensure accountability in a world characterised by unequal 
relationships6.  To compensate for this situation, the author suggests another type of 
accountability: surrogate accountability.  Surrogate accountability describes a situation 
where less powerful actors can demand accountability from a more powerful actor via a 
“surrogate”.  Rubenstein (2007) illustrates this by arguing that in the context of foreign aid, 
donors can act “as surrogates for aid recipients by sanctioning NGOs that fail to meet 
accepted standards of aid provision, but aid recipients cannot sanction donors”. 
Rubenstein’s reference to power-relationships makes the study valuable when 
considering the context in which accountability is practised on an everyday basis.   
 
Similar to other studies, Rubenstein (2007:620,621) highlights benefits associated with 
ensuring accountability.  These benefits are, however, not “concrete7”.  In a sense, they 
can be considered as values necessary for a healthy political culture.  This is of real value 
when focusing on the strength of democracy within a country.  Still, the benefits 
highlighted by Rubenstein (2007) do not include tangible outcomes, such as improved 
service delivery or a healthy environment.  The tangible benefits are what the following 
water project study is concerned with.  Although my study agrees that accountability is 
valuable in fostering healthy democratic values; it is important to highlight that people 
want, and need, an outcome that is visible.  People want to see an improvement in their 
living conditions, especially if those living conditions are of such a nature that it makes it 
difficult to survive. 
 
                                            
6 If one actor has more power than another, it is difficult for the less powerful actor to demand 
accountability from the more powerful actor. 
7 The benefits of accountability include “promoting rule following”; “promoting substantive or procedural 
norms”; “promoting civic virtues”. 
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Rubenstein’s study also looks at accountability in a variety of areas, although these areas 
all share a similar theme of power-relationships and the impact thereof on accountability.  
In contrast to Rubenstein and the other studies, the following study is limited to evaluating 
accountability within one area, namely, water projects.  This is believed to keep the study 
focused and to discover the importance of accountability in the sustainability of water 
projects.  Through this, the value of political accountability can be evaluated in a single 
practical situation. 
 
The second influential study is by Laban (2007:355-367) and considers accountability and 
rights in local water governance.  The important element that Laban highlights is that both 
decision-makers as well as beneficiaries (of water projects) should be accountable.  This 
is essential in order to ensure successful management of water resources (2007:355-
358).  Laban’s study is important because it highlights that accountability should be 
practised by all actors, and not just by decision-makers. 
 
2.3  Placing Political Accountability within the context of Democracy and Good 
Governance 
It is generally agreed, on a national and international level, that South Africa is a 
democratic country.  Reference made by a country about its believed democratic 
foundation is in most cases accompanied by outspokenness to a commitment to good 
governance.  A study about political accountability requires using the concept within a 
specific political system.  The political system context allows discussing political 
accountability in more detail than a general discussion would have provided.  Because of 
the belief in South Africa’s status as a democratic country, the following study places 
political accountability within the environment of democracy and good governance.  
 
2.3.1  Political Accountability and Democracy 
A number of authors confirm the importance of accountability within democracy8.  Besides 
accountability, there are a number of elements that are associated with democracy.  
Some of these concepts include free and fair elections, a judiciary that is independent of 
the executive, a civilian government (the armed forces are not in control of government), 
the rule of law is upheld, freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of 
                                            
8 A number of authors emphasises the importance of accountability in democracy.  These authors 
include Przeworski, A., Stokes, S.C., and Bernard, M. (in Dunn 1999a:329-344), Dunn (1999a) and 
Mathur and Skelcher (2004). 
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speech, and more.  These characteristics remain in place when they are built into a 
system of accountability.  For example, elections keep politicians accountable to voter 
needs and demands; an independent judiciary can keep the executive accountable for 
decisions it takes; by having a civilian government, the armed forces are kept accountable 
to serve citizens and not to rule over them by force; upholding the rule of law holds 
everyone accountable to act within the law; and lastly, civil liberties, such as freedom of 
speech, serves as an additional way to hold the government accountable for its actions or 
behaviour. 
   
Democracy cannot be defined without making mention of accountability, unless every 
individual in such a political system has an exemplary moral character that will guide 
his/her actions and behaviour towards others.  Accountability is, therefore, integrated into 
a system practising democracy: it strengthens the governance system for the benefit of 
the demos (the public). 
 
Forming part of the foundation of democracy is the idea of ‘democratic anchorage’ 
(Sorensen and Torfing 2003 in Mathur and Skelcher 2004:4).  Mathur and Skelcher 
(2004:4) argue that institutions of public governance should operate from this platform.  
Democratic anchorage links collectively determined goals to activity and performance 
within a governance network.  The concept of democratic anchorage, itself, highlights 
the importance of legitimacy, consent and accountability within democracies (Mathur 
and Skelcher 2004:5).  The implication is that accountability, as an element of 
democratic anchorage, guides activity, performance and goals within a governance 
network.  Similarly, in a study focusing on water projects, the activity, performance and 
goals within the project are highlighted.   
Figure 2 illustrates the above: 
 
Figure 2 Democratic Anchorage 
 
   Goals ←- - -- - - - - Democratic anchorage - - - - - - -→ Activity and performance 
                                        (legitimacy, consent, accountability) 
 
Without using the term democratic anchorage, Dunn (1999a) supports Mathur and 
Skelcher’s (2004) argument “that institutions of public governance should operate from 
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this platform”.  Dunn (1999a:329) argues that democracy supports the need for and 
correctness of public and collective action, providing legitimacy to politics.   
At the same time, democracy accepts that there is a system of authority/hierarchy of 
authority, where “those who command are different from those who obey”.  This hierarchy 
presents potential hazards to the political system, which democratic states aim to curtail 
(Dunn 1999a:329).  Political accountability is used to “control” these potential hazards 
(Dunn 1999a:332).  Political accountability serves as a system of sanctions that highlights 
to all individuals that certain forms of behaviour are “especially unwelcome”.  
Furthermore, political accountability “assuages the bitterness of political defeat, and gives 
those who would otherwise have little motive to do so a reason for staying in the game” 
(Dunn 1999a:332).  In effect, persons consent to the rule of a specific government. 
In essence, institutions of public governance should operate from a platform, among other 
things, of accountability.  This means accountability plays a large part in guiding activity, 
performance and goals of public governance institutions. 
 
Political accountability is integrated even more within the context of democracy.  Dunn 
(1999a) argues that  
[d]emocratic accountability is best seen as a relation between the past acts 
of those who exercise public power and their future personal liabilities.  Its 
core site is the degree to which rulers, in a democracy, are effectively 
compelled to describe what they are doing while they are ruling us, and to 
explain why they take this to be appropriate: to give us…reasons for their 
actions.  So conceived, the relation of accountability holds fully where 
persons exercising public powers are  
(1) liable for their actions in exercising these powers,  
(2) predictably identifiable as agents in the exercise of these powers to 
those to whom they are liable,  
(3) effectively sanctionable for these acts once performed, and  
(4) knowably so sanctionable for them in advance… (Dunn  
1999a:335,336) 9.  
 
The above highlights that even though it may become “political attractive”, at times, to 
reduce the necessity for legitimacy, consent and accountability (Mathur and Skelcher 
2004:5) “… what is necessary is that one power should be in a position to stop another: to 
bring it to halt” (Montesquieu 1989 [1748]: xi, 4, p155, Dunn 1999a:336 had amended the 
translation).  .  An actor may argue that “through a more focused and potentially private 
relationship with the principal” one can achieve the same democratic objectives as when 
                                            
9 It is important, however, to recognize that the “formal apparatus of the modern constitutional 
representative constitutional democracy is far from ensuring accountability in any of these four senses” 
(Dunn 1999a:335,336). 
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it operated from a platform of democratic anchorage.  However, political accountability is 
necessary, as Montesquieu highlights, in order bring one actor to a halt for the 
safety/welfare of others.  Furthermore, as soon as an actor reduces the necessity for 
accountability (and legitimacy and consent), the means of linking activity and performance 
to collectively determined goals are weakened (Mathur and Skelcher 2004:5). 
 
One of the most visible activities with which one associates political accountability is 
government elections.  This is a means of bringing one actor to a halt and to highlight 
that there are boundaries to what rulers can do (Bruch et al 2005 in Ashton 2007:86; 
Fearon 1999:56; Dunn 1999:298,299; Dunn 1999a:342,343; Stimson 1999:198; 
Barker 2001:132; Dunn 1999:298; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:232; Crook and 
Manor 1998:204;292-300).  As mentioned, elections are not sufficient to ensure 
political accountability between elections (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:237; Fearon 
1999:56,57,68,69; Ferejohn 1999:133,134; Stimson 1999:199; Cheibub and 
Przeworski 1999:232,238,239; Crook and Manor 1998:294; Laver and Shepsle 
1999:294; Dunn 1999a:335; Dunn 1999:299).  A definition about political accountability 
needs to include measuring the concept during election times as well as between 
elections.  
 
In conclusion, political accountability is an essential concept within democratic thinking.  It 
plays an important role in how the relationship between actors develops and turns out.  It 
also acts as a tool to keep those that are in power within certain boundaries.  In this way, 
political accountability acts as a form of guidance to those in power whilst protecting those 
who are subjected to this authority.  Dunn (1999a:337) mentions that accountability can 
easily take on a purely symbolic status, in “the overwhelming deliberative complexity of 
contemporary politics” (Dunn 1999a:337).  Although political accountability has a 
precarious position, it is a concept that is relevant to everyday political and social action.  
For this reason, the level of democracy practised within a country will only be as good as 
the importance each of its elements, of which political accountability is one, enjoys in 
practice. 
 
2.3.2  Political Accountability and Good Governance 
Accountability is clearly a fundamental element of democracy.  2.3.1 ended by 
highlighting that accountability is indicative of how well democracy is practised.  The 
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importance that accountability enjoys is, in a large part, dependent on how much 
emphasis is placed on good governance (within a country, but also within an 
organisation).  For this reason a short overview of how accountability forms part of good 
governance is important.  
  
Heywood (2002:6) argues that governance refers to “the various ways through which 
social life is coordinated”.  A government is only one of the institutions involved in 
coordinating social life in one country.  Heywood highlights that “the development of new 
forms of public management, the growth of public-private partnerships, the increasing 
importance of policy networks, and the greater impact of both supranational and 
subnational organisations” reflect a “blurring of the state/society distinction” (Heywood 
2002:6).  Heywood (2002:6) also states that some associate governance with a reliance 
on consultation and bargaining instead of command and control mechanisms. 
 
There has been a gradual move towards involving more actors in coordinating social life 
or providing essential services (Heywood 2006:6).  The result is that these “new” actors 
and ways of providing services (partnerships) needs to be guided by a tentative 
“philosophy”.  This is reflected in the concept of good governance.  Generally, most 
government institutions and private organisations support democratic principles.  Once 
these principles are being incorporated in the operation of these institutions and 
organisations it is reflected as good governance. 
 
Ashton (2007:77) highlights that good governance includes the partnership between 
government, civil society and science.  This partnership promotes responsible resource 
management, whereby accountability and transparency are fostered. 
 
A good governance system depends on five key principles: openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence.  These five principles should be explicit in 
every decision-making process that affects the livelihoods of stakeholders (Ashton 
2007:86).  Such a system is very focused on engaging all stakeholders in every step of 
decision-making processes (Ashton 2007:85).   
 
Governance incorporates three key components, namely: 
• A guiding ‘philosophy’, or core set of agreed operating principles; 
 16
• The preferred ‘process’ that guides the way that people interact with each other 
and with institutions; and 
• A desired set of ‘products’ or outcomes (Ashton 2007:86). 
 
Accountability is one of the principles of governance.  For this reason, I use the above 
framework as a structure in my study on political accountability.  Political accountability as 
a philosophy has already been touched on in the previous section that considered 
accountability’s place in democracy.  Of more importance is the process that guides the 
way people interact with each other.  Elements of this process includes focusing on: 
 Meeting responsibilities/obligations 
 Including people, and engaging with them 
 Providing information 
 Maintaining credibility 
 Being able to sanction a decision-maker 
 
These elements are discussed in the following section.  After considering these elements 
that constitute the process (of how accountability is practised), the outcomes (or products) 
remain to be discussed.  Within the context of water projects I would expect the outcome 
to mean that water is provided to the community, and that this provision takes place on a 
sustainable basis. 
 
2.4  Deciding on five elements to use in measuring political accountability 
Careful deliberation contributed to a decision to include five elements as encapsulating 
political accountability.  These five elements are responsibility, information, inclusion, 
credibility, and sanctioning.  Literature, confirming the importance of these elements, is 
provided in the following section considering the five elements. 
 
2.4.1 Accountability and Responsibility 
One way in which to determine the level of political accountability within an area or 
system is to evaluate whether the decision-maker has fulfilled its responsibilities.  When 
considering Figure 1 (p6) depicting Barker’s framework of the directions of accountability, 
this means evaluating the implementer’s responsibilities in relation to its superiors, 
stakeholders, and colleagues. 
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Responsibility is linked to the measurement of accountability as follows: 
Firstly, “…[o]ne person, A, is accountable to another, B, if two conditions are met.  First, 
there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B.  Second, B 
is empowered by some formal institutional or perhaps informal rules to sanction and 
reward A for [its] activities or performance in this capacity” (Fearon 1999:55). 
 
Secondly, political accountability is concerned with the understanding of (a) what activities 
or performance an actor is accountable for (Fearon 1999:55,56), (b) what obligations are 
owed by one set of actors to another and finally to the public (Uhr 1992, 1993a in Dunn 
1999:298), and (c) defining to whom an decision-maker is answerable (Caiden 
1988:34,35 in Dunn 1999:298).  Practising accountability through meeting certain 
responsibilities, in effect, means that actor A should ‘give account’ to actor B (Barker 
2001:137-139; Dunn 1999:298).   
 
Lastly, Cloete (1996:74) argues that “[a]ccountability relates to the acceptable or 
unacceptable exercise of powers and the performance of functions”.  Making use of the 
Constitution, Cloete (1996:18,19) continues by arguing “responsibility relates to making 
an institution or a functionary liable for the performance of specific functions.  
Accountability requires institutions and functionaries to explain the positive as well as the 
negative results obtained from the performance of the functions entrusted to them”.  This 
view is reflected by Lawton and Rose (1993:16-17 in Cloete 1996:19) who state that 
“[a]ccountability is the enforcement of responsibility”. 
 
Some of the responsibilities that an actor should meet in order to ensure accountability 
include: 
• promoting openness (transparency) in the decision-making process (SADC 2008; 
Johnston:no date); 
• providing descriptions, explanations and justifications for actions and behaviour 
(Dunn 1999:297-300; Laver and Shepsle 1999:279-282,294,295; Dunn 
1999a:329-336; Barker 2001:133,137-140; Cheibub and Przeworski 
1999:225,232); 
• accepting responsibility when decisions do not work out as planned as a result of 
actions or behaviour of actor A; 
• accepting responsibility for unlawful actions; 
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• engaging in debate with stakeholders, superiors and colleagues about decisions 
(Smith and Hanson 2003:1517); 
• providing evaluation of decisions which allows critics to learn how decisions or 
actions have turned out; 
• provide sufficient definition of employees’ duties in order for the definition to guide 
those employees’ actions (Dunn 1999:300); 
• providing a positive, honest and responsive reaction to enquiries, service requests 
and complaints (Barker 2001:134); and 
• adhering to a set of common principles that define ‘good governance’ (Ashton 
2005 in Ashton 2007:87). 
 
From the above, an actor is also obligated to (a) have the capacity to take certain 
decisions (Dunn 1999:299; Crook and Manor 1998:233,291), (b) show full commitment to 
its duties (Ashton 2007:77), (c) possess certain moral characteristics necessary for good 
governance (Fearon 1999:59,67,68), and (d) act according to national and international 
legislation. 
 
In a situation where the implementer do not possess the necessary skills, knowledge or 
expertise in order to fulfil its obligations, other actors need to be included, or partnerships 
formed (Kings 200710).  Especially in “countries whose governments lack sufficient 
resources to discharge their responsibilities effectively” these partnerships are essential 
(IUCN-ROSA 2001 in Ashton 2007:82). 
 
2.4.2  Accountability means stakeholders are included 
The inclusion and engagement with other actors describes the concept of participation 
within a specific context.  Within this study, participation is used as an element of political 
accountability.  Smith and Hanson (2003:1517) define the process in which “all groups 
participate in decision-making” on matters pertaining to service delivery, as ‘procedural 
equity’.  According to the authors, both procedural and distributive equity (who gets what 
and where in service delivery) are necessary components in “societies in transition”.  
These two types of equity ensure “democratic accountability in service delivery…” (Smith 
and Hanson 2003:1517). 
 
                                            
10Kings, J.  2007.  Interview, Tzaneen.  
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The inclusion of actors is viewed as essential in response to “the growing demands from 
society for governments to be more accountable and transparent” (MacKay and Ashton in 
Ashton 2007:85).  
It is taken that this inclusion means that  
• actors’ existing expertise and experience is made use of in decision-making 
processes; 
• a good relationship between actors is fostered and maintained; 
• actors are included in every step of the decision-making process; 
• actors’ opinion on relevant issues is sought during the decision-making process; 
and 
• formal measures are in place that require and prescribe actor inclusion and 
engagement. 
 
The inclusion and engagement with other actors (a) contribute to exacting responsibility11 
from politicians (Barker 2001:132), (b) influence how decision-makers act or behave 
(Barker 2001:132,138), (c) contribute to sustainable outcomes when all actors participate 
at all levels of managing a natural resource (Ashton 2007:85,94), (d) strengthen 
accountability when actors are included in every step of the decision-making process, and 
not only once the final decision is being made12 (Kings 200713), and (e) enhance the 
relationship between the decision-maker and other actors14 (Crook and Manor 1998:299).   
 
Although public participation enhances the level of political accountability within an area 
or system, it is believed the degree to which decision-makers consult with stakeholders is 
dependent on “the structures of accountability” or practising accountability at the 
institutional level (Crook and Manor 1998:233).  Crook and Manor’s (1998) study 
indicates that public participation is not sufficient, on its own, to ensure political 
                                            
11 The previous section established that ‘meeting responsibilities’ forms part of the concept of political 
accountability; therefore, inclusion and engagement with other actors enforces an element of 
accountability.  It is also evident that this participation is closely linked to ensuring political accountability 
through being involved in the decision-making process of, for instance, a water project. 
12 Good governance’s dependence on five key principles, including accountability, argues that the 
principles should be clear in “every decision-making process that affects the livelihoods of stakeholders”. 
13 Ibid 
14 Establishing a relationship with another (for example, between stakeholders and the project 
implementer) makes it more likely that a project implementer will feel compelled to act in a more 
accountable manner than in a situation where no relationship has been formed. 
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accountability15.  It is necessary that participation be linked to other elements (as all the 
other elements of accountability) in order to ensure political accountability. 
 
2.4.3  Accountability and having information 
The general impression gained from literature focused on accountability is that B should 
be able to determine what A is doing.  Otherwise, how would B know A is accountable?  
Having access to information on A’s actions or behaviour allows B to “observe” A’s 
actions or behaviour.  But, having access to information does not entirely solve B’s search 
to determine A’s actions.  An added requirement is that B will be able to use this 
information to evaluate and determine A’s actions. 
 
Within the context of good governance accountability needs to be  
• “visible”,  
• understandable, and  
• accessible to affected stakeholders throughout the decision-making process. 
This is only possible when stakeholders have access to information and are able to use 
this information. 
 
Without access to, and the ability to use information, not one of the other elements of 
accountability would function optimally.  For instance, in order to sanction (see 2.2.1) 
actor A (i) information is required on who should fulfil which obligations, (ii) information is 
essential in order to determine what A’s responsibility is towards the stakeholders, (iii) it 
has to be clear in what way the decision-maker has failed in its responsibility towards 
stakeholders (Laver and Shepsle 1999:279; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:23016), and 
(iv) information is needed on how actor A should be sanctioned. 
 
Within a system, stakeholders need access to information in order to evaluate (a) how 
decisions and actions are turning out (b) whether decisions and actions have turned out 
as planned.  In this sense, it is taken that mechanisms of accountability include   
                                            
15 This is because (a) a “supportive social and political context” is necessary for “accountability of 
bureaucrats and executive authorities both to elected representatives and to legal/administrative 
mechanisms” (Crook and Manor 1998:291); (b) in a case study of Ghana a “positive record of 
participation and consultation in Ghana did not prevent Ghanaian institutions from performing poorly” 
with regards accountability towards the public (Crook and Manor 1998:290); and (c) public participation 
at the local, or project, level will have little effect if political accountability is not promoted at the 
institutional level (Crook and Manor 1998:299). 
16 In Cheibub and Przeworski’s (1999:230) study, focused on voting, they highlight that it is important 
that voters should be able to determine whom they should sanction.  Voters thus have a “clarity of 
responsibility”. 
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• being able to identify the decision-makers;  
• observing what decision-makers are doing; 
• determining whether these actions fall within the decision-maker’s responsibility;  
• being able to interpret whether actions are in the public interest or not; and  
• being provided with information when decisions are debated, taken and executed 
(Barker 2001:133,138-140; Dunn 1999a:334-343; Ashton 2007:77,87,88; Fearon 
1999:67-130); and 
• all actors should clearly understand their roles and responsibilities and be provided 
with definitions of these roles and responsibilities (Ashton et al 2005 in Ashton 
2007:87; Ashton 2007:87,88; Dunn 1999:300). 
 
2.4.4  Political accountability and credibility 
Credibility means that what an institution promises to do is what it does in reality.  In this 
sense, an organisation should have specific procedures and protocol that will be followed 
in order to guide actions.  Through following these procedures and protocol all individuals 
in the organisation know what actions and behaviour are required of them.  The result is 
that whatever was promised by the institution is delivered.   
 
Furthermore, credibility means that stakeholders can trust in the institution to deliver on 
these promises.  Without credibility, an institution may be hampered17 in fulfilling its 
responsibilities.     
 
Institutional accountability mechanisms also need to enjoy credibility in order to be 
relevant ensuring political accountability (Laver and Shepsle 1999:281).  This is because 
institutional mechanisms and the institutional discretion of actors allows (a) actors to 
evaluate how well a implementer met its responsibilities (b) sanction the decision-maker if 
necessary and (c) be in a position to bring a implementer to halt when it moves outside 
certain boundaries (Laver and Shepsle 1999:285).  The credibility of these mechanisms 
is, furthermore, essential for the “health” of the accountability relationship between a 
decision-maker and its superiors, the stakeholders, and colleagues.  The reason for this is 
that there needs to be a measure of belief in the institution and accountability 
                                            
17 For instance, where an institution do not enjoy credibility in the eyes of the community where a water 
project is to be implemented, the community can show its disapproval of the institution by not 
participating in project discussion forums or through misuse of project infrastructure. 
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mechanisms, on the part of those three actors, in order for the mechanisms to be utilised 
and for it to be effective. 
 
It is important to note that actors may view accountability mechanisms or an institution as 
credible even though the mechanisms do not provide benefits to everyone.  For instance, 
actors may attach credibility to a mechanism for the only reason that a political party, with 
historical significance, has established the mechanism.  As a result, credibility does not 
necessarily lead to real political accountability.  However, in combination with the other 
elements, credibility strengthens political accountability. 
 
2.4.5  Accountability as a sanctioning device 
Accountability as a sanctioning device was discussed in the previous section.  However, 
what remains to be highlighted is that political accountability can only be ensured when all 
its elements are pursued in unison.  Every element supports the functioning of another 
element.  In this way political accountability is fostered within a specific context or system. 
 
2.5  Highlighting the importance of selected elements for the research study 
Evaluating political accountability within water projects requires specific operationalisation 
of the concept.  This operationalisation allows one to quantitatively measure political 
accountability.  As such, it was decided to include at least five elements that are believed 
to be interwoven into a definition of political accountability. 
 
Aspects highlighted by authors in 2.2 do not provide adequate means in which to 
evaluate political accountability.  For example, an obvious point in case is that 
elections cannot be utilised in water projects to measure the concept.  Neither will 
national level comparisons be useful, unless water projects are studied across the 
country.   
 
When one utilise the five elements (or variables) identified in 2.4, the possibility of 
measuring political accountability in water projects become easier.  Employing the 
element Responsibility allows one to focus on responsibilities that the project 
implementer states that it has towards project stakeholders/beneficiaries.  Similarly, 
the elements of Inclusion and Information provide tangible means with which to 
evaluate how community members were included in the project and how much 
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information they received about the project.  The element Credibility provides a 
way in which to determine whether community members perceived the project 
implementer as a credible actor, worth recommending to other villages.  Lastly, the 
element Sanctioning was considered essential in determining whether community 
members utilised this accountability device in the respective water projects. 
 
The selected elements are also easier to investigate at a water project level, where 
tangible outcomes (water provision) allow one to evaluate a decision-maker. 
 
2.6  General points about political accountability 
In ending this section, a few comments about accountability is useful.  First, accountability 
is a retrospective tool.  Only after actions have taken place and the consequences of 
these actions has been evaluated, can the actions of a decision-maker be evaluated 
(Cheibub and Przeworski 1999:225; Dunn 1999a:240; Laver and Shepsle 1999:295).  
This means that accountability mechanisms are “seen to work only when accountability 
has failed” (Laver and Shepsle 1999:295).  
 
Second, accountability forms part of larger concepts.  This was highlighted in the sections 
considering the role that accountability plays within democracy and good governance. 
 
Third, accountability requires synergy between a number of elements (European Union 
2001).  This means that accountability is more likely to be ensured when meeting 
responsibilities, inclusion and engagement with stakeholders, access to information, 
credibility and sanctioning instruments, are pursued in unity instead of focusing on only 
one element. 
 
Fourth, accountability can easily take on only a symbolic status.  However, it is believed 
that political accountability plays a significant role in sustainable outcomes for public 
interests or needs.  Studying this concept is, therefore, essential in order to find an 
adequate response to public needs. 
 
In essence accountability is indicative of the health of democracy in a country or an 
institution.  Political accountability guides actions, performance and goals within this 
country or institution.  The concept is closely linked to categories within democratic 
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theory, which (a) focuses on how to safeguard the public from rulers and (b) how to 
effectively address public interests and demands.  At the same time that accountability is 
important for the health of democracy within a country, the type of governance practised 
within that country influences the importance (or position) of accountability. 
 
The chapter has indicated the elements of political accountability that will be used as 
measurement of the concept in the questionnaires.  These elements include (a) 
responsibility (b) inclusion (c) information (d) sanctioning, and (e) credibility.  Through 
measuring these elements within four projects, a means was established in order to 
evaluate the impact of political accountability on project sustainability. 
 
2.7  Conclusion 
The following study is believed to be necessary in order to gain a better understanding of 
political accountability as practised outside elections.  The study considers a variety of 
elements when evaluating accountability in water projects, thereby considering 
accountability as more than just a sanctioning device or an ability to bring one actor a 
halt.   
 
The focus of the study (water projects) highlights that accountability should also be 
evaluated at ground-level.  Studying accountability on this level provides insight into (a) 
the value attached to the concept by decision-makers through the way they make 
decisions and act on those decisions, and (b) possible operational design limits of a 
particular decision-making institution to ensure accountability.  Accountability, it is 
expected, also leads to tangible outcomes (sustainable water access) for people and not 
just to a healthy democracy. 
 
It is important to note that accountability is imperative within a democracy and also plays 
an essential role in the practice of good governance.  This role allows accountability to 
link goals with actions and performance in almost any context. 
 
The chapter provided an overview of the elements, believed, to be essential in order to 
ensure political accountability.  This requires a decision-maker to meet certain 
responsibilities; include stakeholders; provide necessary information; maintain credibility 
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of accountability mechanisms as well as itself (the decision-maker); and ensure 
sanctioning devices can be used if necessary. 
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Chapter 3: Context and Rationale 
 
3.  Context and Rationale 
Strides have been made in providing equal access to services within South Africa.  
Despite the improvement in service delivery, a number of households within the Mopani 
area still fetch water long distances from their homes.  In most villages, communal 
standpipes are present.  However, the presence of standpipes does not guarantee water 
access.  The following study is interested in why there is little, or no water in villages even 
though water infrastructure (water project) is present.  In order to investigate this 
question, it is essential to highlight the context in which the selected water projects have 
been established.  The context includes (a) the water context in the Mopani district, (b) a 
short description of the Mopani district, and (c) the general impression about political 
accountability within the district.  The section, therefore, evaluates the context in which 
the non-governmental organisation and the municipality need to pursue the elements of 
political accountability when implementing a water project.   
 
3.1 The Water Context in the district 
Through specifically focusing on the Mopani district, this section considers (a) water 
availability (b) water use (c) water capacity (d) service backlogs and (e) the impact of not 
having adequate water access within the selected villages.  By considering these five 
areas, one is able to gain an understanding of the context within which project 
implementers are to establish water projects in a manner that is politically accountable. 
 
3.1.1  Water availability in the district 
South Africa is not a high rainfall country.  Although the Mopani district falls within a 
higher rainfall area (in comparison to the rest of the country) lower lying areas are 
vulnerable to frequent droughts (FAO 2005; Mopani IDP 2007:34).  Within the 
Mopani district there is “stiff competition between the different water users such as 
agriculture, mining and forestry.  To this end water use for domestic purposes 
becomes critical” (Mopani IDP 2007:34,35).  It is estimated that the agricultural 
sector uses around 70% of the available water in the district, leaving 30% for other 
water users (Mopani IDP 2007:34,35).   
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Water is sourced, mainly, from the Groot Letaba River catchment and its 
tributaries.  It is argued that this can be supplemented by the use of increased 
borehole access (Mopani IDP 2007:34).  However, increasing human settlement, 
farming activities and tourism between the Drakensberg escarpment and the 
Kruger National Park have placed pressure on the Letaba River.  The demand on 
this water source is of such a nature that there is a real risk of water shortages 
from existing infrastructure.   
 
Water availability from this source is clearly under pressure.  Groundwater sources 
are also at risk within the district.  In rural areas, a lack of water-borne sewerage 
systems increases the potential of providing polluted water through boreholes18 
(Mopani IDP 2007:43). 
 
In general, Mopani District is well provided with bulk water19 supply infrastructure.  
However, it is argued that there is inadequate pipeline infrastructure within some 
villages.  The distance between villages, and between villages and existing water 
infrastructure, makes it challenging and expensive to provide water to these 
villages.  Water shortage is not only linked to inadequate infrastructure and 
environmental conditions but also to vandalism of infrastructure, unwillingness to 
pay for water services, illegal connections of pipelines by communities, and 
extremely high water usage in areas where there is adequate water access 
(Mopani IDP 2007:32,35). 
 
As highlighted in the previous paragraph, water availability is influenced by how well 
water sources are taken care of.  Issues of pollution, deforestation and weak monitoring 
of urban and industrial water use indicate poor resource protection within South Africa 
(Sanparks 2007).  Prominent environmental organisations also argue that South Africa is 
promoting an attitude of “get rich at all costs” 20.  Furthermore, water management 
                                            
18 In rural areas it is common to make use of “french drain” or pit latrine sewarage systems.  When there 
is a high density french drains or pit latrines within an area, the potential to pollute groundwater is 
dramatically increased. 
19 Bulk water is water that has not been treated, making it unsafe for human consumption. 
20 The South African government is currently pushing all government departments to meet the objectives 
that are found in “5 year plans” of the Asgisa strategy.  The overall aim is to encourage socio-economic 
development in the country (RSA 2007; Robinson 2007).  Such development has in a number of 
instances come at the expense of a “healthy biophysical environment”.  A visible example is the 
extraction of minerals (Middelburg) that are exported or used to develop infrastructure in South Africa.  
Whilst minerals are certainly numerous and useful in encouraging development and providing jobs to 
many people, the manner that decisions are made and executed has resulted in a situation where the 
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schemes, such as bulk water schemes, are “often inappropriate” as they negatively 
influence biodiversity conservation, ecosystem protection and resource management 
(Yeld 2007). 
 
On a national level, 8,2 million people do not have adequate access to water (Mabuza 
2007b).  At the same time, the national population has been steadily increasing21 within 
all the provinces (StatsSA 2007:7,9).  Thus, water access has to be provided to 8,2 
million people as well as to an additional number of people as the population increases.  
This growing population as well as a service backlog to 8,2 million people is placing 
pressure on an already scarce resource. 
 
3.1.2  Water use in the district 
Water use is mainly linked to household consumption and economic activities.  
Water use at household level includes utilising the resource (a) for normal 
household activities, such as washing, cooking, and drinking, (b) within health care 
facilities, and (c) at educational facilities, such as pre-schools, primary and 
secondary schools.   
 
Both the Tzaneen and Gyani area’s economic activity is characterised by 
commercial and small-scale farming activities (Mopani IDP 2007:24,25,32; 
Tzaneen IDP Phase 2 2007/08).  Water is, therefore, utilised to a large extent to 
support these farming activities.  Small-scale farming activities are important in the 
context of rural villages where (a) villages are very far from formal towns for people 
to purchase produce and (b) a high rate of unemployment in the district makes it 
expensive to travel to towns for produce when such produce could be grown at 
home.  At the same time, Limpopo has a large percentage of people who are only 
semi-skilled22, at best (StatsSA 2007:16,26-29; Mopani IDP 2007:25,32).  Small-
scale farming, thus, is a means of providing food whilst also providing a way to 
earn some form of income when there is a surplus produce.  This kind of economic 
activity is very dependent on a reliable, and clean, water source. 
                                                                                                                             
formal town of Middelburg is provided with water that is of poor quality and unsafe to drink (without 
boiling and filtering it first).  
21 Increase from 40,5 million in 1996, to 44,8 million in 2001 and to 48,5 million in 2007. 
22 The population within the district is characterised by (a) a very large percentage of individuals 
between the age of 0-19 years (b) a small percentage of individuals attending any tertiary education 
institution and (c) a notable percentage gap between females with no education and males with no 
education. 
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3.1.3  Water capacity in the district 
In the context of available water, the most likely source of water within rural areas comes 
from groundwater.  However, groundwater has been extensively sourced in the district 
(Mopani WSDP 2002).  At the same time, the lack of proper sanitation facilities in many of 
the district’s rural areas pose a health hazard to communities through the contamination 
of available groundwater. 
 
Government is not ignorant of the need to operate, maintain and upgrade water 
infrastructure. The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) highlights that 
60% of treatment plants (facilities that treat sewage) require urgent maintenance in 
order to prevent further outbreaks of disease, such as cholera (Mpofu 2008).  The 
Mopani district has, within this context, made water services a priority within the area 
of service delivery in the district.  This is evident through the Water Resource 
Infrastructure (WRI) charges23 as well as the building of new bulk water supply 
systems (Opperman 2007:40).  One such scheme is the building of the Nwamitwa 
Dam and the raising of the wall of the Tzaneen Dam to address the water shortage 
problem in the district (Mopani IDP 2007:35).  
 
Although it is argued that the government is committed towards effective water 
management, there is a sense that resources are utilized without sufficiently considering 
decisions.  For instance, it should be highlighted that bulk water supply has been shown 
to be adequate in the Mopani district (Mopani IDP 2007:32,35).  Although the building of 
the Nwamitwa Dam and the raising of the wall of the Tzaneen Dam will contribute to 
agriculture and household users being separated in order for improved access to water, 
the real concern is with adequate (and functional) infrastructure at the household level.  
This infrastructure includes ensuring that purification schemes24 are working in order to 
provide water to households.  
 
Lastly, the Mopani District Municipality (MDM) and media reports indicate that the district, 
and South Africa as a whole, is finding it difficult to retain infrastructure, institutions, 
money and skills required for water resource management in the country.  In this context, 
                                            
23 A means of cost-recovery in order to assist with maintenance and upgrading of exisiting water 
infrastructure as well as establishing new projects. 
24 Schemes treating bulk water in order to make water safe for household consumption. 
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there are a few, or no cost-recovery programmes in place for a number of (small) water 
projects in the district (Kilian 2008b25; Mamarara 200826).  These cost-recovery 
programmes are essential in order to finance new projects as well as for maintenance 
and upgrading of existing infrastructure.  Adequate water capacity within the district is 
essential within the context of low water availability in the area.  However, from the above 
it appears that the district’s capacity to provide water to the public is presented with a 
number of challenges. 
 
3.1.4  Service backlogs 
According to the Community Survey, there has been an increase27 in the percentage of 
households having access to water from piped water inside the dwelling (StatsSA 
2007:52).  Despite this increase, Limpopo is below the national average of households 
having access to piped water (StatsSA 2007:53). 
 
In the Mopani District, around 67 percent of households have access to water 
(Mopani IDP 2007:37 Table 5).  Despite this percentage, the MDM states that most 
of the settlements in the Mopani district do not have adequate access to potable 
drinking water and sanitary facilities (Mopani IDP 2007:110).  The MDM admits 
“[t]he levels of services in these areas are either in terms of RDP (Reconstruction 
and Development Programme28) standards or below such standards. Further to 
that, some rural settlements do not have access to water at all. These communities 
fetch drinking water from wells, pits or rivers” (Mopani IDP 2007:110,111). 
 
A situation also exists where, despite bulk water supply schemes, one area have access 
to water whilst another area is without access (Mopani IDP 2007:111; Kilian 200729).  For 
instance, one village will have access to water through a water project whilst a village 
immediately next to the village with water, does not have water access. 
 
Inadequate provision of water within the district is reflected on a national level by DWAF 
stating that a number of municipal waste-water treatment plants are operating below 
                                            
25 Kilian, A.  2008b. Telephone interview, Tzaneen. 
26 Mamarara, V.  2008.  Interview, Tzaneen. 
27 32,3 per cent in 2001 to 47,3 per cent in 2007 
28 A socio-economic policy framework designed in 1994 to address the unequal socio-economic context 
in South Africa as a result of apartheid policies.  RDP standards are still in use even though the socio-
economic policy was succeeded by first, GEAR and now, Asgisa (the last frameworks are considered 
more market-oriented than the RDP framework). 
29 Kilian, A.  2007.  Interview, Tzaneen. 
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required standards (Mpofu 2008).  Poor standards at these treatment plants have a direct 
bearing on drinking water quality served by the treatment plants.  It is, therefore, 
suggested that South Africa, as a whole, is finding it challenging to provide adequate 
access of drinking water to the public. 
 
3.1.5  The impact of not having adequate water supply 
The impact of not having an adequate supply of water is serious.  Firstly, water is 
essential for daily survival.  This includes ensuring that a person stays hydrated on a daily 
basis.  Secondly, as indicated, a large percentage of the population in the Limpopo 
province do not have specialised skills allowing them to take part in the formal economy.  
This results in a number of people relying on small-scale agriculture for their livelihoods.  
Without water, livelihoods become directly threatened, leading to food shortages and lack 
of income.  In 2005 it was estimated that about 14 million people (roughly a third of the 
total population) in South Africa were vulnerable to food shortages.  The reason was not 
that too little food was produced but that there was a lack of suitable water infrastructure 
in the deep rural areas (Ashton 2007:90).   
 
Within villages visited for this study, the severity of being without water was evident: on a 
number of days pre-schools are without water, leaving children vulnerable to dehydration; 
high school pupils have to stay away from school on days when the community receive 
water in order to collect water; inadequate water supply prevents people from growing 
their own food; and people with boreholes charge high amounts to other community 
members for water.   
 
Water is not only necessary for household consumption and farming activities, it is also 
essential for health services.  Inadequate water supply contributes to outbreaks of 
diseases, such as cholera.  Without a reliable and clean water supply, health facilities are 
unable to provide necessary treatment to patients.  These diseases are (without a clean 
and reliable water supply) never dealt with, contributing to reoccurring outbreaks. 
 
The above is the three most “concrete” issues linked to water access.  There is also an 
economic factor at play.  According to Ashton (2007:90) water supply infrastructure 
development is linked with future economic growth.  Once again, without a reliable and 
clean water source, small-scale agriculture can never progress to commercial farming, 
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thereby contributing to an area’s economic growth.  People are also less likely to settle in 
areas where there is not adequate water supply, in effect not providing a “consumer-
base” to an area. 
 
In conclusion, the MDM states that “[t]he success of local economic development is tied 
to providing basic and other types of infrastructure to the people. Adequate infrastructure 
underpins socio-economic development and determines a people’s quality of life.  The 
provision of adequate municipal infrastructure remains a challenge throughout the district” 
(Mopani IDP 2007:34). 
 
3.2  Description of the Mopani District 
The above section has highlighted the water situation within the Mopani district.  A more 
complete description of the district requires providing a general overview of the district, 
the selected villages and the project implementers.  Such an overview provides insight 
into the socio-economic development within the district.  For purposes of clarity, two key 
projects were selected in the Mopani District.  The two key projects are located in the 
Mopani District in the local municipalities of the Greater Tzaneen and the Greater Gyani.  
 
3.2.1  Demographics 
The Mopani district reflects a high number of villages/rural settlements.  82 percent of 
the population in the Greater Tzaneen area30 and 89 percent in the Greater Gyani 
area31, lives in rural settlements (Mopani IDP 2007:19,20).  The above indicates that (a) 
a large percentage of the district population resides in rural settlements, and (b) within 
the Tzaneen municipality, one ward has to represent around 13 000 people32; in the 
Gyani area, one ward represents around 11 000 people33.  Public interest and needs 
are to be represented within the context that a ward committee consists of a ward 
councillor and, at most, ten members of the community. 
 
In the context that the Mopani district consists of a number of rural settlements, 
there are also a number of indigent households34.  The Greater Tzaneen area has 
                                            
30 The Greater Tzaneen has a total population of 442 282.  Of the total population, 362 453 are rural, 45 
836 urban, and 33 993 farming 
31 The Gyani area has a total population of 276 668.  247 585 are rural, 29 083 urban, and 0 farming 
32 442 282 divided by 34 wards in the Tzaneen area 
33 276 668 divided by 25 wards in the Gyani area 
34 Households that are financially unable to pay for essential services and are subsidised by the 
government. 
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28 552 indigent households; and the Greater Gyani has 21 007 households 
registered as indigent (Mopani IDP 2007:37).  The above information implies that a 
quarter35 of the population in the Tzaneen area (and more than a quarter of the 
population in the Greater Gyani area) is unable to afford to pay for essential 
services. 
 
Linked closely to the number of indigent households within the two municipal areas 
is a high level of unemployment in the district.   In this regard the Gyani area has 
the highest level of unemployment36 (Mopani IDP 2007:22).  60% of the 
unemployed persons in the district are women, where women also make up a large 
part of the population in the district (Mopani IDP 2007:20,22).  This is due to men 
seeking work in provinces, such as Gauteng, with more employment opportunities 
than Limpopo. 
 
Notwithstanding the socio-economic situation of a number of people within the 
district, there is also the reality that more than 50% of the adult population can be 
regarded as functionally illiterate37 (Mopani IDP 2007:21).  At the same time, more 
men have some form of schooling in comparison to women (StatsSA 2007:23-29). 
 
The above elements indicate that water projects will, mainly, be established in rural 
areas in the district.  Within these areas, it may be challenging to implement cost-
recovery programmes (in order to fund maintenance of infrastructure) within the 
context that a large percentage of the population is classified as indigent 
households and that there is a high level of unemployment. 
 
3.2.2  The selected villages/water projects 
For this study the villages of Bellevue, Nwamitwa, Tours and Mamogolo were 
selected.  Tsogang (the NGO) implemented the water projects in Bellevue and 
Mamogolo; Tzaneen municipality implemented the projects in Nwamitwa and 
Tours. Two key projects were selected: Bellevue and Nwamitwa.  The other two 
projects are discussed in the findings but no demographic information is provided 
                                            
35 When you take into consideration that the average household in the Limpopo Province consists of 
four members. 
36 36.9 per cent 
37 “[A]s much as 37.8% of the adult population (older than 20 years of age) has not received any form of 
schooling with a further 13.7% only having completed some form of primary education”.   
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for them.  First, it was difficult to find any demographic information for Tours and 
Mamogolo.  Second, the study is concerned with political accountability on the part 
of the project implementer and this could be evaluated without depending on 
demographic information of Tours and Mamogolo.  However, a basic description of 
the water project in each village is provided.  Take note that Bellevue and 
Mamogolo have NGO projects and Nwamitwa and Tours have Municipality 
projects. 
 
Bellevue is a rural village near the town of Gyani, where Tsogang completed a 
water project in 2001 (Tsogang 2008).  Bellevue has a population of about 2 757.  
Around 1 963 people have access to water above RDP level38 (more than 25 litres 
a day) with the rest below the RDP level.  1 896 people do not have access to 
sanitation services above RDP level.  The village source its water from a variety of 
water sources39 (DWAF(a):no date).  Inadequate sanitation services pose a 
potential threat to the community’s health through possible contamination of their 
groundwater source. 
 
Nwamitwa was randomly selected from ten other villages that are served by the 
Ritavi 1 water project.  Nwamitwa is described as a rural village with a dense 
population of about 8 720.  Around 5 397 people have access to water above the 
RDP level.  Sanitation services for 5 571 people are below the RDP level.  Similar 
to Bellevue, the Nwamitwa village makes use of a variety of water sources.  As 
mentioned, Nwamitwa receives water from the Ritavi 1 project.  This project forms 
part of the Letaba Regional Water Scheme.  Although the Ritavi 1 project was 
implemented by the Tzaneen municipality, it is owned by the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry (DWAF(b):no date).  From the above, it appears that a large 
percentage of the population is without adequate access to water services.  The 
inadequacy of sanitation services to the population poses a potential health risk. 
 
On a national level, it is argued that 88% of all households have access to piped 
water (StatsSA 2007:8).  However, the above information indicates that within 
Bellevue, around 71 percent, and in Nwamitwa, around 62 percent, of people has 
                                            
38 The national government has set a standard for the minimum amount of water that each person must 
have access to on a daily basis.  This basic standard is set at 25 litres water each day per person. 
39 For example, through boreholes or through a spring 
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access to water (whether this is through boreholes, springs or from another 
source). 
 
The last part of this section considers the water projects within the four villages.  In 
Bellevue, standpipes are provided to the community every 200metres (or even 
less).  This exceeds government recommendations.  All standpipes are in working 
condition. 
    
The project was designed for 80 households, with a maximum capacity of 100 
households.  However, reliable and clean access to water in this part of Bellevue 
has attracted a number of people since the project has been established in 2001.  
At the moment the project is providing water to more than 400 households (this is a 
400 percent increase on the initial capacity of the project).   
  
The community was trained to build and maintain the water infrastructure, e.g. the 
water reservoir, the standpipes, water lines connecting the standpipes with each 
other and with the water reservoir, etc.  The community was also able to construct 
a drinking trough for their livestock in 2003.  
 
Although the project was established in a very low rainfall area, it appears as if the 
project is capable of providing enough water to the community.  However, the 
added pressure on this project (because it is functioning) is posing a potential 
threat. 
 
After completing the water project in 2001, Tsogang has handed over responsibility 
for maintenance to the Greater Letaba Municipality. 
 
Similar to Bellevue, Mamogolo is a rural settlement that, it appears, had no service 
delivery until the establishment of the water project by Tsogang (2004-2006).  Although 
Mamogolo is situated close to the Olifantsriver, pumping water directly from the river is 
not safe.  It is apparent that the river water is polluted.  Each household has a standpipe 
inside their yard.   
 
The water project serves around 53 households.  The project has a 40-year horizon.  
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Although respondents stated that the project does not form part of water provision to the 
entire district, the project coordinator said that 14 villages are covered within the larger 
water provision project.  Mamogolo is one of the first villages with a finished project 
(2006). 
 
Members from the community were employed to assist with building the water 
infrastructure.  These community members now have a valuable skill in knowing how to 
fix minor problems, such as fixing leaks. 
 
Initially residents contributed to the purchase of diesoline (R5/household) for the 
pump.  However, the Tubatsi municipality is now providing diesoline each month, 
free of charge.  The amount of diesoline provided to the village is enough for 
Mamogolo to pump water for three days of the week.  Water infrastructure is more 
than adequate for villagers to pump water more than these three days.  However, 
villagers seem reluctant to start paying for diesel again and have chosen to only 
pump water with the diesel provided by the municipality. 
 
The project has been handed over to the Greater Tubatsi Municipality after 
completion. 
 
In 2004 the water project (standpipes) were established in Nwamitwa.  This project 
forms part of the Ritavi 1 project.  The Ritavi 1 project was established in order to 
provide water to ten villages.  Within Nwamitwa, standpipes are located every 200 
metres (or further) within the village.  Similar to Bellevue and Mamogolo, no households 
are left out.   
 
A number of the standpipes have been damaged at the hand of vandals. In other 
places, water leaks into the road.  These water leakages are caused, in some instances, 
as a result of bulldozers doing maintenance work on the gravel roads within the village.  
It is unclear whether pipes were lain too shallow or whether continued bulldozing 
“erodes” the level of the gravel road, thereby exposing the water pipes to potential 
damage. 
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People were not trained during the project how to fix problems, such as changing 
washers, leakages or any other maintenance jobs.  The community rely on the 
municipality to perform these tasks. 
 
The project in Tours was established in 2003.  From information gained, the project 
included standpipes for the upper part of Tours (older part of the village) but focused 
mainly on the building of the Tours dam, a purification plant and lines to lower-lying 
villages.   
 
Only three standpipes are still functional resulting in some community members to 
collect water from a nearby river or making illegal connections to waterlines.  Collecting 
water from the nearby river is contributing to diseases, such as cholera, in the village. 
 
Community members were not trained in the project process in order to do minor 
maintenance on the project. 
 
3.2.3  The project implementers 
Two project implementers were selected.  The one implementer is a non-
governmental organisation (NGO) and the other is a local municipality; both are 
based in Tzaneen, Mopani district.  Both implementers are actively involved in 
water and sanitation projects, especially within rural communities.  The following 
section discusses the two project implementers.  The section is also linked with 
3.2.4 where a list of responsibilities as published by each project implementer is 
discussed.  Within the Literature Study it was argued that fulfilling responsibilities is 
a necessary element of political accountability.  As such, it is important what each 
project implementer states its duties are towards project stakeholders.  The list of 
responsibilities are utilised in the questionnaire in order to measure political 
accountability. 
 
The Tzaneen municipality is classified as a Service Provider40.  Municipalities are 
divided into three categories (A, B, and C) according to Constitutional provisions 
(RSA 1996, section 155(1)).  The classification entails that a 
                                            
40 The municipality provides services, such as water and sanitation services, to people as decided by 
the Service Authority. 
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• “Category A municipality has exclusive municipal executive and legislative 
authority in its area; 
• Category B municipality shares municipal executive and legislative authority 
in its area with a category C municipality within whose area it falls; and 
• Category C municipality has municipal executive and legislative authority in 
an area that includes more than one municipality” (RSA 1996, section 
155(1)(a-b)). 
A district municipality is classified as a category C authority whilst local 
municipalities are category B municipalities.  Through the Municipal Structures Act 
(RSA 1998, section 84), the powers and functions of category B and C 
municipalities are divided between them.  In Mopani, the District municipality 
retained the potable water provision function. 
  
There is a distinction between a Service Provider and a Service Authority.  A service 
provider can be any person(s) or institution(s) that provide a municipal service.  A service 
authority has the power to regulate the provision of a municipal service by a service 
provider (RSA 2000, chapter 1).  A municipality can, therefore, make use of any entity or 
person (government or non-government) in order to provide municipal services (RSA 
2000, sections 76). 
 
The Tzaneen municipality has a responsibility to act according to the district municipality’s 
business plan41 for a specific water project (Kilian 200742; Kilian 2008a43; Mopani IDP 
2007).  As a service provider, the municipality is responsible to implement policy as 
formulated by the District municipality.  It is expected that, as an “extension” of the 
Service Authority, the Service Provider will act in a manner that is accountable in the 
areas for which it has been made responsible.  Oversight from the MDM should, also, 
contribute to the Tzaneen municipality acting accountable in its daily operations.  This is 
                                            
41 According to information from the Tzaneen municipality, the district business plan incorporates the 
following: 
• Project identification 
• Establishing the cost of the potential project 
• Completing a project registration form (attach registration form) 
• Drafting a feasibility report 
• The registration form is accepted after the feasibility report is approved by DWAF 
• A consultant is appointed through a tender process 
• Reporting back on the project 
42 Ibid 
43 Kilian, A.  2008a.  Interview, Tzaneen. 
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especially relevant in the context of the MDM highlighting the importance of accountability 
in its workings (Mopani IDP 2007:63-69;100,101). 
Projects are, furthermore, dependent on the approval of the Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry (Mopani WSDP 2002).  Through this measure, the relevance of proposed 
projects to an area is evaluated prior to implementation.  This provides another measure 
with which to supervise the operation of the Tzaneen municipality. 
 
Despite local government restructuring and increased attention to cost-recovery 
policies, municipalities have struggled in the delivery of services, especially to 
“historically disenfranchised communities” (Smith and Hanson 2003:1517,1518). 
In the Mopani District, local municipalities are aware of the need to deliver basic 
services promptly (Mopani IDP 2007:66,67).  However, it is argued that service 
delivery is influenced by poor communication within and amongst municipalities; 
disintegrated planning; poor collection of rates and taxes; not spending budgets 
fully; a shortage of staff in key positions; lack of capacity; and corruption and fraud 
within the public and private sector.  At the same time, the MDM argues that there 
are insufficient water sources and bulk supply in the area; pollution of natural 
resources; and increased pressure on resources as a result of population growth.  
Accountability is hampered, according to the MDM, by a lack of stakeholder 
involvement strategy; poor co-ordination; lack of a revenue strategy; insufficient 
capacity to track the latest developments within sectors; inconsistent adherence to 
policies; lack of a succession plan; lack of a retention strategy; and the lack of a 
monitoring and evaluation system (Mopani IDP 2007:62-65, Table 14 and 15). 
 
Despite the above concerns, the Tzaneen municipality has the authority to take action to 
effectively exercise powers assigned to it.  The municipality is in a position where it can 
request funding from national government in order, for example, to build large water 
schemes.  It is also connected to a national ‘system’ of other municipalities; each with a 
responsibility to deliver services to their communities.  This means that the Tzaneen 
municipality forms part of a system, which should have a national impact on communities’ 
access to water. 
 
Unlike the Tzaneen municipality, Tsogang is the decision-maker as well as the 
implementer of its water projects.  Tsogang has fewer personnel available, in comparison 
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to the Tzaneen municipality, when implementing water projects.  The NGO seriously 
promotes facilitating and encouraging training programmes within communities in order to 
assist the implementation of a water project.  These training programmes include 
teaching community members to maintain water infrastructure.  Tsogang operates in the 
provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga, focusing on rural communities.  The organisation 
views accountability in water projects as a necessity as, the NGO argues, it influences the 
sustainability of water projects in communities (Tsogang 2008). 
Because of the relatively small size of Tsogang, it is important that each and every 
project, which it implements, is successful.  Without a 100 per cent success rate it is 
questionable whether Tsogang would be able to continue operating. 
 
Both Tsogang as well as the Tzaneen municipality’s ability to operate within areas are 
influenced by the level of influence that traditional authorities have within these areas.  
For example, in a number of areas traditional authorities influence the manner in which 
large parts of the land is made available to individuals for settlement.  These authorities 
also influence the economic “direction” of this allocated land.  Most of the land settlement 
and economic purposes decisions are made on an ad hoc basis.  The result is that 
decisions, sometimes, do not take into consideration the impact it may have on the spatial 
pattern and the rendering of cost effective and efficient services to communities (Mopani 
IDP 2007:32).  In the context of this, both project implementers are required to take this 
reality into consideration when planning and implementing water projects. 
 
3.2.4  Objectives list or list of responsibilities 
In order to measure the operation of the Tzaneen municipality and Tsogang, it was 
essential to determine an exact list of responsibilities that these two organisations 
state they should fulfil.  Very specific lists of responsibilities for Tsogang and the 
Tzaneen municipality were accessed.  The identified responsibilities of each project 
implementer are utilised in the questionnaire measuring Responsibility as an element 
of political accountability. 
 
The Integrated Development Plan of Tzaneen municipality 
It has been highlighted that the Tzaneen municipality is a Service Provider.  This means 
that the Tzaneen municipality does not draft its own business plan but uses the business 
plan of the Service Authority.  For this reason I decided to evaluate the institution’s 
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relationship with project stakeholders on the basis of its (Integrated Development Plan) 
IDP.  The Tzaneen IDP44 guides its actions and decisions in manners pertaining to its 
responsibility towards the public residing in its area of jurisdiction (Tzaneen IDP 
Introduction 2007/08). 
 
The Tzaneen municipality’s IDP (Tzaneen IDP Phase 2 2007/08) includes reference to 
the following objectives: 
• Sustainable service delivery (and sustainable services) 
• Integrated service delivery 
• Forming partnerships with other actors in order to deliver services 
• Democratic and accountable governance 
• Social and economic development 
• Ensuring a safe and healthy environment 
• Encouraging community involvement 
 
The Tzaneen municipality has also adopted the values of Batho Pele45.  This means that 
the municipality says it supports consultation; a high service standard; accessibility to 
other actors; courtesy towards other actors; the availability and accessibility of 
information; openness and transformation; services at an affordable tariff; and, an 
entrepreneurial developmental culture (Tzaneen IDP Phase 2 2007/08). 
 
The objectives reflect the municipality’s determined responsibilities towards the people 
falling within its area of jurisdiction.  Because of reference to Batho Pele within a number 
of government documents and visions, this study employed the values as part of the 
municipality’s responsibilities towards the public.   
The section dealing with good governance highlighted that accountability guides activities, 
goals and the performance of an actor.  As such, these objectives and values provide a 
means of evaluating the level of political accountability as practised by the municipality46. 
 
                                            
44 It should be noted that a district IDP  is drafted after considering, and prioritising, all the needs from 
the different wards.  It is imperative that an identified project falls within what has been identified in this 
IDP.   
45 These values are measured in the manager’s Performance Plans. 
46 The objectives and values guide the municipality’s activities, goals and performance. 
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The objectives list of Tsogang 
Similar to the Tzaneen municipality, a number of Tsogang’s determined responsibilities 
towards its stakeholders are also found within its defined role, principles (or values) and 
objectives list47, as combined in the following paragraph. 
 
Some of Tsogang’s objectives are: 
• Facilitating more equitable access to economic and social services; 
• To support and assist innovative and appreciative approaches to improve the 
delivery of services at the local level; 
• Delivering those services to ensure that they are appropriate, efficient, and 
sustainable; 
• To ensure that integrated planning and development at the municipal and 
provincial levels; 
• To support and assist training (of partners as well as beneficiaries) in the delivery 
of services and programmes; 
• To strengthen and support the partnership between government and civil society in 
addressing the imbalances of the past; and 
• Within development initiatives, to promote the cross-cutting issues of 
o Equity within projects, 
o Local economic development (LED), 
o Environmental protection, 
o Good governance (transparency, accountability and responsibility), 
o Capacity building, and 
o Service delivery to the poor in all Tsogang’s programme activities. 
 
Similar to the Tzaneen municipality, Tsogang uses the South African Constitution 
(RSA 1996) an a number of governmental policies48 as its legal framework to guide its 
actions and behaviour in providing water and a healthy environment for rural and peri-
urban communities in Limpopo and Mpumalanga. 
 
                                            
47 I modified the list to include only items that have a probability of being researched, without resorting to 
a nationwide survey (e.g. assisting in eradicating poverty and assisting the government of South Africa 
to close the poverty gap).   
48 In the case of Tsogang, it makes use of the Procurement Policy; Total Quality Assurance Policy; 
Affirmative Action Policy; Communication Strategy Policy; Dispute Resolution Policy; ESETA 
Learnership Policy; Gender Policy; Infectious Diseases Policy; and a Language Policy. 
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It is important to note that Tsogang’s objectives list is a reflection of the Tzaneen 
municipality’s IDP list of responsibilities.  It was decided to utilise only the 
municipality’s list of responsibilities in the measurement of political accountability as 
practised in the four projects.  This is believed to allow better comparison between the 
two project implementers. 
 
The Tzaneen municipality and Tsogang also provided a range of duties owed to the 
community.  These duties guide the municipality’s and Tsogang’s actions and decisions.  
It is important to note that the responsibilities identified by these two implementers reflect 
all the elements of accountability as identified in the Literature Study.  Furthermore, both 
implementers recognise that political accountability works when all its elements are 
pursued in unity. 
 
3.3  The Accountability Context 
The water context and the description of the district, villages and project implementers 
have highlighted the context in which accountability is practised. The next section 
encapsulates the accountability context within the district.  It highlights the obligation of 
government towards the public with regards to service delivery.  It also considers, in 
general, how the municipality (and also the non-governmental organisation) perceives 
accountability towards the public with regards to service delivery. 
 
3.3.1  Constitutional responsibility 
In essence, the Constitution (1996) was adopted in order to address the historic 
imbalances in South African society that resulted in a majority of people living without 
access to clean water and proper sanitation (Mopani IDP 2007:45).  
 
The new Constitution highlights that everyone has the right to have access to sufficient 
food and water (RSA 1996, section 27(1)(b)).  The state is obligated to realize this right to 
access through reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources 
(RSA 1996, section 27(2)). 
 
At the same time, the Constitution highlights that everyone has the right to (a) an 
environment that is not harmful to their health; and (b) have the environment protected, 
for the benefit of present and future generations.  Reasonable legislative and other 
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measures must (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; 
and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development (RSA 1996, section 24).  A 
healthy environment, i.e. resources that are not polluted and which are used in a 
sustainable manner, is essential for continued water access. 
 
The Constitution also prescribes certain measures to the government in order for this 
institution to fulfill its obligation to the public of ensuring access to water.  This is 
encapsulated by section 155(6), which highlights that each provincial government must 
(a) provide for the monitoring and support of local government in the province; and (b) 
promote the development of local government capacity to enable municipalities to 
perform their functions and manage their own affairs (RSA 1996).  The government, 
through provincial government, is thus obligated to ensure that local government capacity 
to provide access to water is strengthened whilst monitoring this level of government to 
ensure the fulfillment of its functions and duties (RSA 1996, section 155(6); Mopani IDP 
2007:75, own emphasis). 
 
As a result of the new Constitution there have been changes in the structure and 
operation of local government (Smith and Hanson 2003:1517,1518).  This has taken 
place in order for local government to (a) provide democratic and accountable 
government for local communities; (b) ensure the provision of services to communities 
in a sustainable manner; (c) promote social and economic development; (d) promote a 
safe and healthy environment; and (e) encourage the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in the matters of local government (RSA 1996, section 152).  
The local government is, therefore, empowered and obligated to fulfil the above duties 
for the benefit of the public. 
 
The above has highlighted the constitutional duty of local government to provide access 
to water to the public.  However, NGOs can also provide this service to the public.  
According to local government legislation, when local government does not have the 
capacity to ensure adequate service delivery it can (a) form partnerships with 
organisations that will then provide those services and (b) appoint organisations to 
provide essential services to the public.  Although these organisations are appointed by 
local government to provide services to the public, these organisations are obligated to 
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operate according to national legislation, thereby ensuring these organisations operate 
accountably.  Organisations, such as Tsogang, therefore commit themselves to operating 
within the constitutional principles when providing services to the public (RSA, section 2).  
At the same time, legislation dictates that the government is still obligated to oversee the 
operation of these organisations that provide basic services to communities. 
 
In essence, government has a responsibility to provide access to water to communities 
according to the Constitution.  This provision can take place through the government or 
via organisations monitored by government.  At the same time, NGOs (as any other 
person within the Republic) are under obligation to uphold the principles of the 
Constitution.  Therefore, any NGO providing services to the public is also required to be 
accountable within its operations. 
 
3.3.2  Accountability in South Africa 
Chapter 1 has highlighted that it is challenging to evaluate whether a decision-maker is 
politically accountable.  Through the new Constitution, various pieces of legislation and 
policies have been introduced in order to guide government and public actions.  A number 
of these documents make reference to accountability.  This emphasis on accountability is 
intended to ensure accountability on the part of one actor towards another in the South 
African context. 
  
However, as mentioned, precise definition of what accountability entails is rarely provided 
in documents. Inadequate provision of a precise definition has two major outcomes.  One 
result is that persons within a government institution or NGO have little guidance in how 
to implement accountability.  The second outcome is that the public finds it difficult to 
evaluate whether the actions and behaviour of the government institution are 
accountable. 
 
Within the above context, accountability in South Africa needs to be practised.  At the 
same time that there is a general lack of definition of the concept, the type of democracy 
practised within a country plays a role in the position of accountability within the system.  
South Africa is a parliamentary democracy.  According to Cheibub and Przeworski 
(1999:223), parliamentary democracies are characterised by a legislature able to change 
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the executive49.  In a parliamentary system, voters elect representatives to the legislature, 
who, in turn, elect the executive.  This makes the executive accountable to the legislature.  
The legislature is, thus, in a position to ensure accountability from the executive on behalf 
of the public. 
 
This executive (who is accountable to the legislature/indirectly to the public) appoints 
persons to establish, in this case, water projects across the country.  The appointed 
persons for each water project is, therefore, obligated to be accountable to the public50 
(see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Three-tier government representation 
 
Executive 
                          ______________________↓__________________ 
                         ↓            ↓ 
                     Dwaf                   Dwaf 
       Provincial/Local Government                 
                          ↓_________________________________________↓ 
↕ 
Legislature 
↕ 
Public 
 
Although South Africa operates on the basis of parliamentary democracy, inadequate 
definition of the concept as well as other factors contributes to a situation where 
accountability is not enjoying the importance required for a healthy democracy.  For 
instance, an article from the Mail and Guardian (Serjeant 2008) argues that 
“[f]oundational principles of accountability, transparency and the independent 
operation of institutions through which constitutional democracy is mediated, including 
the judiciary, are all under pressure”.   
                                            
49  If there is a large enough majority supporting such a change, the legislature can change the 
executive.  
50 It is clear that there is a “direct” line of accountability between the public, the legislature, and the 
executive.  The executive appoints the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (Dwaf) to oversee 
water projects within the country.  Some projects, like dams, Dwaf establishes on its own.  For other 
projects, Dwaf delegates the duty of establishing projects to provincial or local government. Evidently, 
there is not a “direct” line connecting Dwaf and the public; accountability is maintained through the 
executive-legislature-public line. 
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An illustration of this pressure on the foundational principles of democracy (and 
specifically accountability) highlight factors that impact accountability’s position within 
the South African democracy.  The example is the on-going water ‘fight’ between 
citizens of Phiri and the city of Johannesburg.  In short, the issue highlighted here is 
that water meters were installed, without consultation and without the knowledge of 
Phiri residents.  The city of Johannesburg was also accused of withholding information 
about the installation of these metres (Mabuza 2007b).  Residents were, furthermore, 
left without water for almost eight months and had to walk to others areas to fetch 
water (Mokoatsane 2007).  The illustration highlights a general failure to fulfil an 
obligation towards another actor, be it providing information or water access. 
   
Another issue that has become evident in South Africa is the dominance of the African 
National Congress (ANC) within the political arena.  It is argued, “if a single party controls 
the entire government…then that party’s ideal point is implemented as policy” (Laver and 
Shepsle 1999:286).  The ANC’s dominance on the political scene has the potential to 
result in this party’s policies being implemented at the cost of other parties’, and citizens’, 
policy ideas.  This is not conducive to accountability between political leaders and 
citizens51 (De Lange 2007). 
 
As a result of the electoral system in South Africa, where voters elect political parties and 
do not vote for political leaders, the accountability relationship between the public and 
government decision-makers becomes distorted.  Parties are elected on a proportional 
basis according to the national vote.  In this Proportional Representative (PR) List system, 
political leaders compile the final lists of party candidates.  As a result, members of 
parties tend to be more accountable to party leaders than to voters in order to be included 
on the lists.  Members of the Parliament do not necessarily feel themselves accountable 
to constituencies since there are no constituencies in a PR List system. 
 
3.3.3  The accountability context at the local level 
From the previous section, accountability at the national level appears to be under 
pressure.  Considering the importance each water project implementing institution52 
                                            
51 In an interview with Mr Jan de Lange, Tzaneen, it was emphasised that difference in opinion (between 
the ANC and opposition parties) does not enjoy serious discussion and it has resulted in a party-centric 
focus instead of maintaining close contact between the public and the government. 
52 Within the following overview of the accountability context, take note that more information is available 
on the operation of the local government than Tsogang.  As a result, local government is described 
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attaches to accountability within water projects contributes to an evaluation of the 
concept at the local level.  In this way, it is believed the level of accountability as 
practised in an individual institution highlights the building blocks of national attachment 
to accountability. 
 
It appeared that the two implementing institutions, the Tzaneen municipality and 
Tsogang, held slightly different views about accountability in water projects.  In general, 
it is understood from documents and interviews with Tsogang personnel that 
accountability in a project is a necessity and not an option.  For Tsogang, accountability 
influences the sense of ownership that communities attach to a project in their area.  
Through ‘community ownership’, Tsogang is convinced that communities are more 
likely, and willing, to “take care” of project infrastructure and operation.  This is argued to 
lead to sustainable projects (Kings 200753; Mamarara 200754; Mamarara 200855).   
Tsogang, furthermore, does not have the ‘security’ of having a tax-base from which to 
source its projects.  This, most likely, encourages the organisation to develop and 
implement methods and approaches that contribute to projects functioning effectively 
over a long period of time without having project beneficiaries depend on continued 
finance and maintenance support from Tsogang.  Prudent financial management, i.e. 
financial accountability, as well as Tsogang’s focus on community training in water 
project implementation build the perception that this NGO values accountability in its 
operation. 
  
Despite donors’ trust in Tsogang’s operation (Irish Aid 2007), the Tsogang’s operations 
have been considered wanting in a few areas.  Webster (1998) highlights that questions 
about the accountability of Tsogang in water projects are related to perceived lack of 
impartiality56 of the NGO in the project cycle.  The author also indicated NGOs, such as 
Tsogang, need to include local government at every stage of the project cycle since this 
level of government is a valuable role-player at the local level.  Tsogang has included in 
its list of objectives that partnerships with all levels of government are to be fostered.  
                                                                                                                             
more fully than the NGO.  However, the study is concerned with how accountability is practised within 
water projects.  Although the context plays a definite role in this operation, it is believed that the 
research question will be addressed despite less institutional information available about the selected 
NGO. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Mamarara, V.  2007.  Interview, Gyani. 
55 Mamarara, V.  2008.  Interview, Tzaneen. 
56 In this specific water project, Tsogang was seen as siding with one actor (Mafefe Water Committee) 
and this may have alienated other actors from the project cycle. 
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According to this, Tsogang is obligated to include local government within its operation.  
Neglecting to do this indicates a failure on the part of Tsogang to fulfil all its stated 
duties, i.e. acting in manner that is not accountable to all parties within the project cycle.  
However, since 1998 it is clear that the NGO has addressed the identified issue57. 
 
Similar to Tsogang, the Tzaneen municipality recognises that accountability is essential 
in delivering essential services to communities.  The municipality states that a system of 
checks and balances should be in place in order to evaluate the content, causes and 
consequences of decisions for communities (Tzaneen Policies 2007).  Despite the 
municipality’s recognition of the importance of accountability in its daily operation, most 
of the municipal personnel involved in water projects were dismissed as a result of 
serious irregularities58 (Kilian 2008b). 
 
It is important to note that because the Tzaneen municipality falls under the supervision59 
of the MDM, the MDM’s views regarding accountability have an impact on the Tzaneen 
municipality’s practice of accountability within water projects.  In this regard, the MDM’s 
mission is (a) to provide integrated sustainable equitable services through democratic 
responsible and accountable governance, and (b) to promote the sustainable use of 
resources for economic growth to benefit the community (Mopani IDP 2007:59,69).  The 
MDM has also approved and (partially) implemented a by-law that focuses on 
administrative and operational efficiency and monitoring of employee and organizational 
performance (Mopani IDP 2007:56,76,83,84).  The above suggests that the MDM 
supports accountability within its own institution and, therefore, it is assumed that 
municipalities under its supervision would also follow this vision. 
 
A difference between Tsogang and the local government is that Tsogang attaches an 
objective (equitable and sustainable service delivery) to the necessity for accountability 
in its operation.  The Tzaneen municipality, on the other hand, neglects to adequately 
highlight this objective.  Instead, “the pace at which services are delivered to the 
                                            
57 In an interview with the project coordinator (September 2008) it was evident that Tsogang worked 
closely with the district and local municipality in the area as well as with DWAF and environmental 
health offices. 
58 When I spoke to Mr Kilian in April 2008 he informed me that the staff of the water services 
department, except him and another colleague, were suspended pending an investigation into apparent 
irregularities with projects.  When speaking to Mr Kilian again in August 2008 I was told that the 
suspended staff had all been dismissed.  
59 The MDM “employs” the Tzaneen municipality in order to provide certain services; at the same time, 
supervising and monitoring the operation of the Tzaneen municipality in the provision of these services. 
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community” is emphasised more than other objectives (Mopani IDP 2007:56, own 
emphasis).  The MDM guides the activities and behaviour of the municipalities falling 
within its jurisdiction.  In this sense, the emphasis placed on the pace of service delivery 
influences smaller municipalities to focus on this objective.  This focus comes at a cost 
of focusing on quality or effectiveness of service delivery, thereby nullifying the 
purpose60 of accountability within service delivery. 
 
Another issue highlighted is that there is an impression that municipal “procedures are 
there to direct administrators [and also councillors] on good governance and 
accountability” and do not focus a lot of attention on accountability from contractors 
towards the public (Tzaneen Policies 2007, own emphasis; Mopani IDP 2007:69).  It is 
important that all actors within an institution, as well as contractors appointed by the 
institution, should remain accountable towards the public. 
 
In summary, both Tsogang as well as the Tzaneen municipality appear to value 
accountability within its operations, when considering written documents.  The following 
section considers responsibilities, which the Tzaneen municipality finds challenging to 
implement.  Considering the duties that are found difficult to fulfil presents the reader 
with an understanding of the context in which accountability should take place at the 
local level.  Highlighting this is meant to make people aware of challenges and not to 
accuse an implementing institution for finding it difficult to fulfil those responsibilities. 
 
3.3.4  Responsibilities that are presenting a challenge 
Specific constitutional duties and responsibilities are assigned to local government, as 
evident from 3.3.1. 
 
The Tzaneen municipality61 has highlighted that a number of these stipulated duties still 
need to be addressed within the institution.  Five sections highlight these duties. 
 
The municipality is concerned about its duty to 
(a) provide democratic and accountable government for local communities.  From 
municipal documents it becomes evident that the institution is concerned about a skilled 
                                            
60 Sustainable service delivery as an outcome of political accountability (see literature study). 
61 Some of the responsibilities, which pose a challenge, is highlighted by MDM but is also echoed 
through communication with the Tzaneen municipality (but not necessarily in publications of the 
Tzaneen municipality). 
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and knowledgeable workforce; public participation in municipal processes62; monitoring 
project implementation; developing and improving institutional systems, processes and 
procedures focused on good governance; and ensuring effectiveness and efficiency 
within the municipality, within the budget process as well as service delivery.  Only 
through addressing these concerns can good governance be achieved (Tzaneen IDP 
Phase 2  2007/08; Mopani IDP 2007:59,66,76,78).  The institution argues that, within 
ensuring policy goals, roles should be clear; definitions of terms and words should ensure 
that goals are understandable; the procedure in implementing goals should be clear; and 
that persons should be aware that contravention of the policy (guiding goal-attainment) 
might lead to penalties or other reasonable action (Tzaneen Policies 2007; Mopani IDP 
2007:65). 
 
(b) provide services to communities in a sustainable manner.  The MDM states that 
access to sustainable quality and affordable services in the district should be improved.  
The MDM shows concern that the institution’s planning should take future demand into 
consideration; infrastructure investment and services should also be fostered; municipal 
assets should be maintained and upgraded; and sound engineering principles should be 
employed in the design and implementation of water services in the district (Mopani IDP 
2007:36,78).  In the sense that the MDM is the coordinating institution in the district, it is 
believed that any concern the MDM has about the district is a reflection of the situation at 
the local municipal level.  
 
(c) promote social and economic development (Mopani IDP 2007:36,66) 
 
(d) promote environmentally sound practices in order to advance a safe and healthy 
environment (Mopani IDP 2007:36,66), and 
 
(e) encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 
matters of local government.  An announcement in a Tzaneen newspaper highlights the 
idea of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) within the province in order to ensure improved 
service delivery (Letaba Herald 2008).  The Tzaneen municipality and the MDM has 
argued that service delivery should be improved through partnerships with community 
based organisations and NGO’s (Tzaneen Policies 2007; Mopani IDP 2007:75).  The 
                                            
62 Determining community needs and ensuring enough information is available in order to guide 
planning, prioritization and implementation of service delivery (IDP Mopani 2007:60,65) 
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MDM shows concern that there is a need to develop a culture that fosters active public 
participation in the IDP process (Mopani IDP 2007:7663).   Appropriate communication 
mechanisms should also be established, ensuring community capacity building for 
community participation to take place.  The community should also be able to provide 
input for the IDP through a proper consultation process.  This is believed will ensure 
effective and sustainable relations64 between the community and government  (Mopani 
IDP 2007:76; Tzaneen Policies 2007; Tzaneen IDP Phase 2 2007/08).  
 
Meeting the above responsibilities (which the Tzaneen municipality and the MDM struggle 
to meet) is expected from local government according to section 152 of the Constitution 
(RSA 1996).  The above indicates (specifically the duties to ensure accountability and to 
provide sustainable and equitable service delivery) that the Tzaneen municipality is 
finding it challenging to fulfil its constitutional obligations.  Within the context of the 
Tzaneen municipality and the MDM identifying that a number of key duties of the local 
municipality are challenging to meet, water projects are to be implemented. 
 
3.4  Rationale 
Given the above context, it is evident that water provision is still a tangible issue within the 
Mopani district.  At the same time, there are continued demands for service delivery on a 
national scale.  These demands range from basic water access, such as standpipes, to 
public demands for affordable water access (Mabuza 2007a; Mabuza 2007b; Mpofu 
2008). 
 
Despite South Africa being classified as a democracy, thereby geared to serve the needs 
and interests of the demos (the public), the issue of adequate water access remains. 
This is in contrast to the Constitution (RSA 1996) highlighting basic human rights and the 
manner in which the country should operate. 
 
Democracy is, in essence, a way of governing for the benefit of the public.  This benefit 
must include having mechanisms in place, which should prevent issues, such as 
demands for service delivery, from ever escalating into potential crisis-points. 
                                            
63 This can be linked directly with a need for increased participation in the affairs of the Tzaneen 
municipality since the MDM’s IDP consists of the IDP’s of all the municipalities within its district. 
64 The importance of public participation in the formulation and implementation of the IDP of 
municipalities is considered vital.  This participation is one of the objectives of the Constitution and is 
“one of the cornerstones of the White Paper on Local Government” (Tzaneen Policies 2007).   
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One such mechanism is political accountability.  Since South Africa is a democracy, it 
should follow that political accountability should enjoy relative importance in the daily 
operation of government.   
 
The lack of precise definition of accountability forms one part of the rationale for the 
decided study.  Through the literature overview the study determines what political 
accountability means.  The next question is then: how do you measure political 
accountability?  One way is to measure the concept by considering a real-life issue.  In 
this case it was apparent that a large percentage of households in the Limpopo Province, 
especially rural areas, do not have access to a clean and reliable water source.  Access 
to such a clean and reliable water source is being addressed through a number of water 
projects in the province. 
 
The focus on water provision projects highlights the second reason for the study.  
Although water projects are being established in a number of areas, quite a few of these 
projects are not functional in the longterm.  Considerable cost goes into the establishment 
of a water provision project.  Taking this cost-calculation into consideration one would 
expect that every effort will be made to ensure that projects remain functional over a long 
period of time.  Why is this not the case?  A number of reasons can be suggested for this 
failure.  The study aims to evaluate whether the level of political accountability within a 
project impacts project sustainability.  Determining whether political accountability has an 
impact on project sustainability or not, provides a means of identifying or eliminating 
elements believed to influence project sustainability. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.    Methodology 
4.1  Research Question 
The Introduction has highlighted that, from laws and documents dealing with service 
delivery, it is not clear what the requirements are for accountability.  It was asked whether 
a decision-maker needs to only meet one requirement in order to be regarded as 
accountable.  Also, is there a difference between a government institution and a non-
governmental organization with regards to the degree of political accountability practiced 
by each actor? 
 
The following study is interested in exploring political accountability as practised in every 
day activities that impact the public’s socio-economic well-being.  This includes exploring 
political accountability within water project implementation.  Evaluating political 
accountability within the setting of water projects needs to include linking the evaluation 
with a tangible outcome.  As stated in chapter 3, a number of villages in the Mopani 
District do not have access to water despite water infrastructure being present.  
Evaluating political accountability within water projects is, therefore, linked to determining 
whether improved political accountability within a water project may result in water 
projects functioning for an extended period of time.  As such, the research question asks  
 
Is there any political accountability in water projects and does political 
accountability impact project sustainability? 
 
In this regard, the hypotheses tested were: 
• H0 There is no link between political accountability within a water project and water 
sustainability; 
• H1 Political accountability within a water project has an impact on water 
sustainability. 
 
4.2  Nature of Research 
The study wants to find out whether there is any accountability in water projects and 
whether accountability (if there is any) leads to project sustainability.  Therefore, the 
study focuses on exploring the impact of one factor, political accountability, on project 
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sustainability.  This is accomplished through quantitative methodology.  The 
questionnaire measured the political accountability of two project implementers 
(municipality and a non-governmental organisation) within four water projects (two 
projects were selected from each implementer).  The study is descriptive in the sense 
that it provides an overview of the water situation and demographic indicators within 
the Mopani district.  Through the exploration of the role of political accountability on 
project sustainability, the study also aims to provide a probable explanation for the 
degree of sustainability found in some water projects. 
 
4.3  Data Collection 
Literature on political accountability was compiled in order to determine what the concept 
should, ideally, incorporate.  Through the literature study five elements were identified 
that defines political accountability. These elements are (a) meeting specified 
responsibilities, (b) providing information, (c) include stakeholders/beneficiaries in 
decisions, (d) sanctioning, and (e) credibility. 
 
Another qualitative method used was the utilisation of information gained through a 
number of semi-structured interviews.  These semi-structured interviews consisted of 
meeting respondents from Tsogang, the Tzaneen municipality and the Tzaneen 
Business Chamber and discussing (a) water provision in the district, (b) budget 
management in order to fund water projects, and (c) operating practice in establishing 
water projects. 
 
As mentioned, data was collected, primarily, through a quantitative approach.  In order 
to evaluate political accountability in water projects at the village level, the following 
method was used: 
 
(a) Two implementing institutions were selected that implement projects in seemingly 
different ways65.  The selected implementers were the Tzaneen municipality and 
Tsogang, a non-governmental organization  (NGO).  Within each institution, one 
person closely involved with water projects (who also works within higher management 
level within the selected institution) was interviewed from a set questionnaire.  
Responses from the implementer were employed in order to verify responses from the 
                                            
65 I decided that within an evaluation of political accountability within water projects it would be useful to 
compare two actors that are, usually, considered not to operate in a similar manner.      
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selected villages.  For example, when respondents in a village stated the date when a 
project was finished, the implementer’s response should confirm those responses.  
Responses from the two implementers were, as such, utilised in order to confirm 
responses from project beneficiaries. 
 
(b) Four villages were selected on the basis of the type of water provision by the 
selected implementers to the community.  The minimum requirement for selecting a 
project was the establishment of standpipes every 200metres within the village.  As 
such, the villages of Bellevue, Nwamitwa, Mamogolo and Tours were chosen through 
random selection.  The villages of Bellevue (NGO project) and Nwamitwa (Tzaneen 
municipality project) were taken as the two key projects.  Within each village, 
respondents were selected, where each respondent was interviewed from a set 
questionnaire (see section 4.3.1). 
 
(c) Data gained through the questionnaire allowed an evaluation of the research 
question.  This was accomplished in three parts (i) within each village/project an 
evaluation was done to determine the level of political accountability within this 
village/project, (ii) in every village the sustainability of the project was determined (is 
the project still functioning effectively), and lastly, (iii) the level of political accountability 
in each village was compared to the sustainability of the water project in each village.  
This last comparison allowed conclusions to be drawn relating to whether political 
accountability has an impact on project sustainability. 
 
4.3.1  Selecting the community respondents 
In each village, every effort was made to interview either (a) members of the water 
committee or (b) members of the community who regularly attended community 
meetings related to the water project in the village.  Such interviews ensured that the 
respondent would be in a position to provide insight for a large percentage of the 
aspects addressed within the questionnaire. 
 
Randomly selected respondents were also subject to meeting an equal-gender 
representation.  However, it was generally found that respondents’ consist of an 
overrepresentation of women compared to men (Table 1) and in the older age class 
(Table 2).  As mentioned in chapter 3, it is believed that men find employment in 
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provinces with more employment opportunities, thereby resulting in an 
overrepresentation of women.  Furthermore, respondents were required to have 
attended community meetings related to the water project or form part of the water 
committee of the village in order to be interviewed.  This resulted in an older age group 
being interviewed.  
 
Table 1 Gender distribution for the respondents in each village. 
Village Male Female Total 
Bellevue 3 7 10 
Mamogolo 6 5 11 
Nwamitwa 4 6 10 
Tours 3 5 8 
 
Table 2  Number of respondents, in each village, for six age groups. 
Village 18-19 20-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41+ Total  
respondents 
Bellevue 0 0 4 3 2 1 10 
Mamogolo 0 0 3 3 1 4 11 
Nwamitwa 0 0 2 3 5 0 10 
Tours 0 0 1 2 3 2 8 
 
Community respondents were interviewed from a set questionnaire.  An introduction of 
the researcher, by a person selected by the project implementer, to community members 
was essential for data collection on the chosen water projects.  Data collected through the 
assistance of community members (or beneficiaries) provided most of the data needed to 
evaluate political accountability within each selected water project. 
 
4.3.2  The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire used to interview beneficiaries, as well as the project implementers, 
is mostly similar and measure exactly the same elements.  However, a few questions 
were added to the questionnaire designed for the project implementer (Appendix B) 
and other questions added to the beneficiary questionnaire (Appendix A).  Adding 
extra questions allowed a more in-depth picture of political accountability as 
experienced/perceived by the two groups - implementers/beneficiaries.   
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The questionnaire also included a few open-ended questions.  It was considered 
necessary to include open-ended questions because (a) a few questions required the 
respondent to provide motivation for a selected answer and (b) in one section of the 
questionnaire, project related information was required in order to evaluate a specific 
element66 of political accountability. 
 
Face-to-face interviews were done with both the implementers as well as the project 
beneficiaries.  When doing the first interview, opportunity was allowed for the respondent 
to expand on or explain responses.  This was found to be very time-consuming and tiring 
for both the respondent as well as the interviewer.  Despite the “down-side” of a long 
interview, this allowed the interviewer to focus on specific elements within the selected 
projects and how these elements (as encapsulated in the questionnaire)influenced project 
sustainability. 
In order to compensate for the time it took to interview one respondent, it was decided to 
include research assistants to help with interviews.  The selected persons were able to 
speak the first-language of respondents.  This served as a valuable way in which to gain 
the trust of respondents as well as to ensure more reliable responses (less likelihood of 
misunderstanding between the interviewer and the interviewee).  
 
The content of the questionnaire considered five elements (criteria) of political 
accountability as identified within the literature study: 
• Responsibility 
• Information 
• Inclusion 
• Sanctioning 
• Credibility 
 
The first element considered accountability as fulfilling certain obligations towards another 
actor.  The obligations employed to measure whether the individual project implementers 
fulfilled those duties involved using the list of duties as described in the Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP67) of the Tzaneen municipality as well as a list of duties of 
Tsogang.  It was found that, overall, Tsogang listed similar duties to the municipality’s 
                                            
66 Sanctioning 
67 Every municipality is required by law to formulate an IDP.  The IDP is a framework that (a) identifies 
priorities within the municipality’s jurisdiction and (b) formulates strategies to effectively address priority 
areas.  All municipal actions and decisions are to be guided by the municipality’s IDP. 
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IDP, and even more.  In the end, I used the municipality IDP list for both implementers in 
order to be able to compare the two implementers’ fulfilment of certain responsibilities.  In 
addition, I employed aspects of meeting responsibilities as identified in the literature 
study. 
All the other elements (access to information; inclusion of beneficiaries; ability to 
sanction the project implementer; and the credibility of the project implementer) were 
measured according to characteristics of political accountability as highlighted in the 
literature study. 
 
After interviewing both implementer and beneficiaries of each village, the separate 
responses from the implementer and the beneficiaries were then compared.  This 
comparison was done in order to verify facts, such as when a project was finished.  
Thereafter, each village’s responses, with regards the elements of political 
accountability, were evaluated.  This analysis, combined with a general impression of 
each village on the day of the interviews, contributed to a notion of the level of political 
accountability within each water project as practised by the project implementer.  The 
level of political accountability within the four projects was then compared to each 
other.  Comparing the four projects/villages allows one to (a) determine in which 
village the degree of political accountability was relatively high and (b) reach an 
answer about whether political accountability  has an impact on project sustainability. 
 
4.3.3  Research scope and constraints 
Evaluating political accountability was limited to one municipal district in the Limpopo 
Province, in which only two key water projects were selected.  One of the ‘verifying’ 
projects (Tours) is also within the Mopani District Municipality (MDM).  Mamogolo, 
however, is situated in the Greater Sekhukhune District Municipality, Mpumalanga.   
  
A study considering water projects within a relatively small area is useful for a few 
reasons.  Service delivery is a concern for every person, whether you have access to 
services or whether you are still waiting for it.  It is therefore a visible, and practical, 
manner in which to determine the level of political accountability as practised by service 
providers.  Secondly, it is an easier way (than looking at the concept on the national level) 
to highlight to the public what political accountability needs to incorporate and what it 
should not be.  In a small way it thus serves an educational purpose.  Lastly, the study is 
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focused on determining whether political accountability has an impact on project 
sustainability.  The study, therefore, serves a practical purpose in aiming to improve water 
provision. 
 
The timeframe of the study considers one project finished in 2001 and the last project 
finished January 2007.  The evaluation of political accountability is, as such, focused on 
the time from 2001 onwards and do not consider water projects established prior to this 
time.  It should be noted that in 2001 local government underwent major restructuring68 to 
its operation and functions, having an impact on water project implementation. 
 
4.4  Statistical methods 
The SPSS version 16 was used to analyse the data.  Statistical methods were 
utilized69, making use of: 
 
(a)  Exploratary data analysis:  
• Stem-and-Leaf analysis – visual presentation of the data distribution; 
• Frequency diagrams  - illustrating the distribution patterns; and 
• Cross-tabulations were used to look at the relationships between two 
variables. 
 
(b)  Testing differences: 
• Chi-Square analysis to test for significant differences between villages; and  
• Mann-Whitney Test: Testing whether significant differences were detected 
according to the Chi-Square analysis.  The Mann-Whitney Test was 
employed in identifying the village. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
68 For instance, district municipalities were established with the objective of coordinating local 
municipalities within their jurisdiction.  As such, a local municipality was, prior to 2001, responsible for 
every step of, for example, establishing a water project.  Post-2001, the district municipality delegate 
certain project-steps to local municipalities and other steps to private organisations. 
69 Discovering Statistics by A. Field (2000) for selecting which methods to employ for analyses. 
 61
Chapter 5: Findings 
 
5.  Findings 
Political accountability of an implementer was evaluated according to the degree in 
which the implementer met the identified criteria measuring accountability.  In this study 
it was taken that an implementer is required to meet the criteria of responsibility, 
information, inclusion, sanctioning and credibility in order to be perceived as politically 
accountable. 
 
An implementer’s actions were evaluated by focusing on each element but also, through 
determining an overall level of accountability (by taking all five elements together and 
determining the level of political accountability on the part of the implementer).  In 
essence, the research question was evaluated by determining whether a project/village 
that shows a high degree of political accountability also shows that the water project is 
still functioning effectively (project sustainability). 
 
The overall political accountability and the overall sustainability of a project were also 
determined for each village.  This provides a valuable overview of the analysis.  
Measurement of political accountability involved comparing the four villages/projects 
with each other.  It must be stressed that each village was linked to a specific water 
supply institution, e.g. NGO or municipality. Although the main aim was to determine the 
degree of politically accountability, an additional component was also tested – Is there a 
significant difference in accountability between the two water supply institutions?  
 
It was difficult to find a large number of respondents who fulfilled the requirement of 
either having attended community meetings related to water or being part of the water 
committee within the village.  As a result, data analyses depended on a small sample 
size.  This makes it difficult to generalize findings but the results are important to give us 
some understanding of accountability in water projects. 
 
5.1  Measurement of the five elements of political accountability 
The questionnaire (see Appendix A) is divided into five sections.  Each section 
measures an element of political accountability, as elected for this study.  Question 1-24 
measures the responsibilities of each project implementer, as stated by each institution 
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in their ‘list of responsibilities’.  The degree in which a project implementer is believed to 
have fulfilled the stated responsibilities was used as a measure of this criterion.   
 
It is important to note that the variable responsibility consists of dimensions that are 
evaluated on a more detailed basis in two other sections, Inclusion and Information.  
Referring back to the literature study, it was argued that accountability means that an 
actor fulfills specified responsibilities towards another actor.  A project implementer is, 
therefore, obliged to fulfill the stated obligations.  Although these variables were 
measured in Q1-24 (see heading: Responsibility and Accountability), it was decided to 
analyse the dimensions within responsibility that are also considered for the variables 
inclusion and information in those two sections.  This means that Q9-14 and Q17&18 
are measured in the sections dealing with inclusion and information.   
 
As a result of discussing Q9-14 and Q17&18 in the other sections, three dimensions 
remained in the section Responsibility.  The variables in these dimensions include: 
sustainability of delivered services (Q1-8,19-24), good governance (Q15), and a 
question asking respondents directly whether they believed the implementer had been 
accountable in the project (Q16). 
 
Sustainability of delivered services looked at service delivery obligations of the project 
implementer.  For example, ‘is water provided to the community’, ‘how many days/week 
is water provided to the community’, ‘how long has the project been functioning’, and 
more.  Variables related to sustainability were analysed in order to employ findings 
related to sustainability as a means of evaluating project sustainability.  This served as a 
method to evaluate whether a project’s political accountability is linked to the 
sustainability of the project. 
 
Two questions remain in this section, Q15 (good governance) and Q16 (accountability).  
Q15 measured respondents’ perception of whether the project had been implemented 
through good governance.  Q15 and Q16 (accountability) were used as indicators to 
determine whether respondents believe the implementer had been accountable in the 
project.  Q16’s responses were employed to compare the overall questionnaire findings 
(of political accountability) with what respondents directly stated about accountability in 
the project (see heading:Overall Analysis).  The remaining elements (Inclusion, 
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Information, Sanctioning, and Credibility) were discussed as they are found within the 
Questionnaire (Appendix A).  
 
5.2  Exploratory analysis 
The responses between the villages on the Overall Political Accountability (OPA) are 
presented in Figure 4.  The general impression is a major difference between the village 
regarding the responses, with Bellevue and Mamagolo indicating a more positive trend 
toward OPA whereas the other two villages responded negatively. 
 
The plot indicates70 that the project implementer was the most accountable in Bellevue; 
followed by Mamogolo (both NGO projects).  There is a significant difference between 
the level of political accountability as perceived in Bellevue compared to the degree of 
political accountability in Nwamitwa and Tours (municipal projects).  However, Tours is 
an outlier.  Figure 4 indicates Tours’ position in relation to the other three villages.  This 
position is influenced by an overall negative perception of Tours about the project 
implementer’s political accountability during the project as well as unhappiness about 
the project outcome. 
Figure 4 Stem-and-Leaf analysis on the overall response toward political accountability (numbers 
on the left of the graph represent the measurement scale employed within the questionnaire; closer to 
‘1’ indicates a higher degree of political accountability). 
 
                                            
70 The thick black line presents the average; with the two “arms” indicating the range of responses.   
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Figure 5 Stem-and-Leaf analysis on the overall response toward sustainability 
 
 
 
Comparing figure 4 and figure 5, one can determine that projects indicating more 
sustainability are also the projects that reflect a high level of political accountability on 
the part of the project implementer (Bellevue and Mamogolo). 
 
The responses from the various villages is markedly skewed – and do not fit a normal 
distribution pattern. The implication is that normal parametric statistical test would not 
be appropriate for testing hypothesis.  
 
5.3  Measurement of the criteria for political accountability 
Measurement involved (a) separately evaluating each criterion of political 
accountability and (b) evaluating the overall political accountability found within each 
project. 
 
5.3.1 The relationship between responsibility and accountability 
The chi square test indicates that within the section measuring the correlation between 
responsibility and accountability, there exists a relationship between the measurement 
scale and the specific village.  Most of the variables in this section show that there is a 
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relationship between the measurement scale and village (as a variable).  The 
exceptions are question nine71, question fifteen72, and question eighteen73. 
 
Within this section, responsibility was further divided into measuring the implementer’s 
responsibility with regards to (a) service delivery (or sustainability of delivered 
services) (b) inclusion, (c) governance, (d) accountability, and (e) information.  Within 
this section sustainability of delivered services, accountability and governance will be 
discussed.  Questions related to inclusion and information will be discussed within 
their specific sections.  Take note that according to the list of responsibilities from each 
implementer, as highlighted in the literature study, both actors indicated that these 
responsibilities should be met in their operations. 
 
Within the context of sustainability of delivered services responsibility, the implementer 
was evaluated according to (a) providing water to the community, (b) providing water 
to all members of the community, (c) providing water 24hours/7 days a week, (d) 
building water infrastructure that is of a high quality, (e) the project has provided water 
for many years, (f) the implementer ensured that water is safe for people to use, (g) 
the implementer did not harm the environment through the project, and (h) the 
implementer provides water at an affordable tariff.  Questions 19-24 are also focused 
on the sustainability of service delivery.  Three questions within this group of questions 
are believed to be important.  These are Q22, Q23 and Q24.  The questions are 
focused on (a) the length of time that respondents have been receiving water since the 
project was finished, (b) the number of days respondents have access to water each 
week, and (c) respondents’ perception of how well the project implementer met its 
responsibility to the community of providing water. 
   
Findings indicate that Mamogolo and Bellevue show a very high level of agreement 
that water is provided to the community.  Combining the two agreement options 
(strongly agree and agree), Mamogolo and Bellevue indicates 100 per cent 
agreement.  Nwamitwa indicates 60 per cent agreement and 40 per cent disagreement 
with the statement.  Tours revealed the lowest score with only 12.5 per cent of 
                                            
71 Determining whether the project forms part of water provision to the entire district. 
72 Determining whether the project was established through good governance. 
73 Determining whether the implementer was open in its actions and decisions. 
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respondents agreeing that water is provided to the community and 87.5 per cent 
disagreeing with the statement.  These findings are illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Q1: Water is provided to the community: H0 (water provision) rejected, 
Χ2=19.4, df=8. The perceptions between villages differ on a 95% probability level. 
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. Figure 7. Q2: Is water provision equal: H0 (water provision is equal) rejected, 
Χ2=39.9, df=9. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% probability level. 
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Figure 6 indicates water provision to the community.  The equality of provision was 
also evaluated (Figure 7).  In Bellevue 90% of respondents agreed that all members of 
the community have equal access to water.  Mamogolo indicated 100% agreement.  
Nwamitwa showed more than 50% agreement. Tours disagreed almost 90% that 
water is provided equally. Tours’ response is linked to the previous question.  It is also 
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linked to information from respondents that there are only three working standpipes 
within the village.  These standpipes are not “distributed” equally within the village. 
 
An important part of service delivery is Q3, which asks respondents whether they have 
water 24hours/7 days per week.  Bellevue indicated 90 percent strongly agree with the 
statement and Nwamitwa indicated 10 percent agreement.  Mamogolo and Tours 
indicated 100 per cent disagreement with the statement (figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Q3: Water is provided to the community 24h/7d per week: H0 (water 
provision 24h/7d) rejected, Χ2=30.3, df=8. The perceptions between villages differ on a 
99% probability level. 
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The findings related to Mamogolo need further explanation.  Although Mamogolo 
respondents indicated that water is not provided to the community on a daily basis, 
this is not as a result of the implementer.  Water can be pumped, and used, on a daily 
basis.  However, this requires diesoline.  At the moment the community receives free 
diesoline on a monthly basis from the local municipality.  The amount of diesoline 
received is only enough for the community to pump water three days a week.  In order 
to pump water every day, the community will have to purchase diesoline using its own 
resources. 
 
From the data it appears that 100 percent of Bellevue respondents believe that water 
infrastructure is of high standards; Mamogolo indicates 90.9 percent agreement; 
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Nwamitwa indicates 80 percent agreement; and Tours indicates 37.5 percent 
agreement (figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Q4: Water infrastructure appears to be of high standards. H0 (water 
infrastructure is equal) rejected, Χ2=18.5, df=9. The perceptions between villages differ 
on a 95% probability level. 
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Bellevue and Mamogolo indicated 100 percent agreement that water has been 
provided for many years.  This is despite Mamogolo’s water project only being finished 
in 2006.  Nwamitwa indicated 60 percent agreement with the statement.  Tours 
showed 37.5 percent agreement that water has been provided for many years.  
Bellevue is the oldest project selected (2001), followed by Tours (2003), Nwamitwa 
(2004) and Mamogolo (2006).  This question is linked to two other questions within this 
section: for how long did the community receive water once the project was finished 
(Q22) and for how long does the community have access to water each week (Q23). 
 
Both Bellevue and Nwamitwa indicated 90 per cent agreement that water is safe to 
drink; Mamogolo respondents show 100 per cent agreement.  Tours showed 50 per 
cent agreement. 
 
Respondents from all the selected villages showed a minimum of 80 percent 
agreement that the implementer ensured the environment was not harmed during the 
establishment of the project.  Despite these positive findings, I do not believe that 
responses should be used as a reliable indicator that the implementer protected the 
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environment in its operations.  Only one respondent, of a total of 39, mentioned 
knowledge that an environmental impact study should be conducted prior to any 
project being started.  Unfortunately, respondents were not requested to provide a 
definition of what they consider environmental protection to incorporate.  I believe 
respondents’ knowledge and perception of environmental protection needs to be 
investigated since this is closely linked to how well a water source will be protected by 
a community.  Water source sustainability is the responsibility of a project implementer 
as well as a community. 
 
Q8 considers respondent perceptions of whether water is provided at an affordable 
tariff.  In this regard Bellevue, Mamogolo and Nwamitwa all indicate 100 per cent 
agreement with the statement.  Respondents highlighted that water is provided free of 
charge to the community (when water is provided).  Tours showed 50 per cent 
agreement and 50 per cent disagreement.  Once again, further explanation is required.  
Respondents who disagreed with the statement argued that there is no water, thus, 
water is not provided at an affordable tariff.  On the other hand, respondents who 
agreed with the statement stated that the little water that is received (three standpipes 
are still functional) is free of charge. 
 
As mentioned, question 19-24 measured further aspects related to the sustainability of 
delivered services.  Three questions were highlighted as important to the study: Q22, 
Q23 and Q24.  Cross-tabulations are provided to indicate the difference between the 
four villages related to these questions. 
 
Table 3 Length of water reception 
  Village of Respondent 
  Bellevue 
(N) 
Mamagolo 
(N) 
Nwamitwa 
(N) 
Tours  
(N) 
Total  
(N) 
1 - 12 Months 3 0 2 0 5
1 - 2 Years 0 11 0 0 11
2 - 3 Years 0 0 3 0 3
Longer than 4 Years 7 0 5 1 13
Q22 Since receiving 
water, how long after did 
you continue to receive 
water? 
Total 10 11 10 1 32
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Considering Q22 (table 3) it should be remembered that the project was finished in 
Bellevue (2001), Mamogolo (2006), Nwamitwa (2004) and in Tours (2003).  As such, 
Mamogolo’s indication that the community has received water between 1 and 2 years 
is an accurate description of the project.  Seven respondents in Bellevue indicate that 
the project has been functional for more than four years (in reality it means the project 
has been functioning for seven years).  The three respondents who stated the project 
has been functioning 1-12 months cannot be explained except to assume that the 
respondents did not understand the question.  Nwamitwa’s project should have fallen 
into the catogory ‘longer than four years’.  However, half of the respondents stated that 
the project has been functioning for less than three years.  The other half stated that 
the project has been functioning longer than four years.  In Tours, only one respondent 
indicated at Q19 that water is received.  This respondent stated that the project in 
Tours have been functioning for longer than four years.  However, taking into account 
that the rest of this respondent group indicated that they do not receive water (Q1 and 
Q19), this one respondent’s answers cannot be utilised as indicative of the project.  
Q22 needs to be evaluated in combination with Q23. 
 
Table 4 Water provision per week 
  Village of Respondent 
  Bellevue 
(N) 
Mamagolo 
(N) 
Nwamitwa 
(N) 
Tours  
(N) 
Total  
(N) 
Less than 2 days a week 2 0 10 1 13
2 - 4 Days 0 11 0 0 11
7 Days a week 8 0 0 0 8
Q23 How long do you 
have access to water 
each week? 
Total 10 11 10 1 32
 
Q23 (table 4) indicates that Bellevue is the only village with water access each day of 
the week.  Mamogolo has water access 2-4 days each week (refer to discussion at Q3 
for reason for this access).  All the respondents in Nwamitwa indicated they have less 
than 2 days water access in a week.  Tours indicated in Q1 and Q19 that they do not 
receive water. 
 
Q24 (table 5) asked all respondents whether they believe the implementer met its 
responsibility to the community in providing water.  Eight respondents in Bellevue 
indicated the implementer met its responsibility fully; one respondent indicated the 
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implementer met most of its responsibility; one respondent provided a ‘don’t know’ 
response.  All the respondents in Mamogolo believe the implementer met its 
responsibility fully to the community.  Seven respondents in Nwamitwa believe the 
implementer met part of its responsibility or did not meet it at all.  Four respondents in 
Tours indicated the implementer met part of its responsibility; four respondents believe 
the implementer did not meet its responsibility at all. 
 
Table 5 Implementer responsibility 
  Village of Respondent 
  Bellevue 
(N) 
Mamagolo 
(N) 
Nwamitwa 
(N) 
Tours  
(N) 
Total  
(N) 
Met if fully 8 11 2 0 21
Met most of it 1 0 1 0 2
Met part of it 0 0 6 4 10
Did not meet it at all 0 0 1 4 5
Don't Know 1 0 0 0 1
Q24 How well did 
implementer meet their 
responsibility? 
Total 10 11 10 8 39
 
The question evaluating whether the implementer ensured the project was established 
through good governance does not show that there is a relationship between the 
measurement scale and village.   
 
An interesting question added to the questionnaire is Q16 (figure 10).  This question 
asks respondents whether they agree or disagree that the implementer was 
accountable in the water project.  It was not emphasised to respondents that the 
questionnaire measured political accountability on the part of the project implementer.  
The interest in this question relates to conscious respondent responses (Q16) and 
what the entire questionnaire highlights about political accountability.  In this question 
respondents were directly asked whether the implementer was accountability.  Ideally, 
responses to this question should correlate with the entire questionnaire’s content 
(seeing that the entire document measures political accountability). 
In this regard, both Bellevue and Mamogolo indicate 100 per cent agreement that the 
project implementer was accountable in the project.  Nwamitwa shows 60 per cent 
agreement and Tours 50 per cent agreement with the statement.  See figure 7. 
 
 72
Figure  10. Q16: Was the implementer accountable in the project. H0 (Accountability 
equal) rejected, Χ2=28.9, df=9. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% 
probability level. 
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Q16 is further examined in the Overall Analysis in order to highlight whether there 
is a difference between respondents’ “conscious” answer of whether the 
implementer was accountable and what is revealed through the entire 
questionnaire’s measurement of accountability in a specific village. 
 
5.3.2  The relationship between information and accountability 
Within this section respondents could indicate agreement or disagreement with 
statements.  There were also questions that considered the amount of information 
made available to the community; how this information was made available to the 
community; and what impact the amount of information had on how the project turned 
out. 
 
Firstly, the questions that required agreement or disagreement are discussed.  These 
questions were divided into four parts: infrastructure, people, project results and 
maintenance tariffs.  Each of these parts aimed to determine whether information was 
made available to the community regarding the selected parts.  In Bellevue and 
Mamogolo respondents indicated 100 per cent agreement that information was made 
available to them regarding infrastructure (Q25, Q26).  This included information about 
the type of water provision (standpipe or yard tap).  Nwamitwa showed 95 per cent 
agreement and Tours 62.5 per cent agreement. 
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Information about people involved determined whether the community knew who the 
implementer persons were who worked on the project (Q28); if the community know 
who the liaison person is between the community and the implementer (Q29); and 
whether someone from the implementer can be contacted if there is a serious 
maintenance problem (Q30).  With Q28, Bellevue and Mamogolo indicated 100 
percent agreement that they knew who the implementer persons were who worked on 
the project.  Nwamitwa showed 80 percent agreement and Tours 50 percent 
agreement. 
 
At Q29 (liaison/contact person) Bellevue indicated 90 percent agreement.  Mamogolo, 
Nwamitwa and Tours showed 100 percent agreement.  This indicates that both the 
municipality and the NGO (a) made a lot of use of the liaison person during the project, 
and/or (b) that the liaison person performed his/her duties very well. 
 
With regards to project results, Bellevue showed 100 percent agreement that the 
implementer made information available about how the project turned out (Q27).  
Mamogolo indicated 90.9 percent agreement and Nwamitwa 70 per cent.  Tours 
disagreed fully (100 percent) that information was made available to the community 
about how the project turned out. 
 
50 percent of respondents in Bellevue indicated that the implementer communicated to 
the community whether they will have to pay water tariffs in order to fund maintenance 
of the water project (Q31).  Mamogolo showed 100 percent agreement.  Nwamitwa 
indicated 30 percent agreement and Tours 42.7 percent. 
 
The information-accountability section also considered whether the community 
believed they had received enough information relating to the water project (Q33).   
In this regard, table 6 indicates the percentage figures that the four villages indicated 
regarding the amount of information they believed the community received. 
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Table 6.  Amount of information made available 
 More than  
Enough (%) 
Enough  
(%) 
Some  
(%) 
Not enough  
(%) 
 Bellevue 20 50 0 30 
Mamogolo 54.5 36.4 9.1 0 
Nwamitwa 10 20 50 20 
Tours 0 0 62.5 37.5 
 
The findings of table 6 need to be taken into consideration when interpreting the 
findings of Q35.  Q35 asked respondents whether they believed that the amount of 
information they had received had made an impact on how the project had turned out.  
Put another way, the question aims to determine if enough information to respondents 
is positively linked to whether the project is successful.  Findings are summarized in 
table 7. 
 
Table 7.  Impact of the information 
 Big impact  
(%) 
Some impact  
(%) 
Small impact  
(%) 
No impact  
(%) 
evue 40 30 0 30 
Mamogolo 100 0 0 0 
Nwamitwa 40 20 40 0 
Tours 25 0 50 25 
 
Respondents from each village indicated the following methods, summarised in table 
8, employed by the project implementer to make information available to the 
community. 
 
Table 8.  Information methods 
 Community  
Meeting  
(%) 
Pamphlets 
 
(%) 
News- 
Paper  
(%) 
Contact  
Person  
(%) 
Discus- 
Sions  
(%) 
Reports  
 
(%) 
House  
Visit  
(%) 
Other  
(Chief)  
(%) 
Bellevue 100.0 20.0 10.0 50.0 40.0 40.0 10.0 40.0 
Mamogolo 90.9 27.3 0 90.9 90.9 54.5 0 100.0 
Nwamitwa 90.0 50.0 20.0 80.0 90.0 60.0 10.0 90.0 
Tours 75.0 0 0 62.5 87.5 25.0 0 50.0 
Average 89.0 24.0 30.0 71.0 77.0 45.0 20.0 70.0 
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Table 8 indicates that, on average, community meetings, the contact person, 
discussion forums, project reports and approaching the chief, are utilised as key 
methods to make information available to the community.  
 
Q35 (table 9) measured the impact the amount of information made available to a 
respondent had on how the project turned out. 
 
Table 9 Impact of the amount of information 
  Village of Respondent 
  Bellevue 
(N) 
Mamagolo 
(N) 
Nwamitwa 
(N) 
Tours 
(N) 
Total 
(N) 
Big impact 4 11 4 2 21
Some impact 3 0 2 0 5
Small impact 0 0 4 4 8
No impact 3 0 0 2 5
Q35 Impact amount of 
information made available 
to respondent had on how 
project "turned out" 
Total 10 11 10 8 39
 
 
In Bellevue, respondents who stated that the amount of information had made a big 
impact on how the project turned out provided the following reasons: 
• Information helps the community and the implementer to work well together; 
• Information assists problems with the project to be resolved; 
• Information is important in order to protect the water source and also to 
maintain the water infrastructure; and 
• Information from the water committee is important in order to successfully link 
up with the local municipality (has taken over the project) when a problem 
needs to be resolved. 
All the respondents who stated that information had a big impact on how the project 
turned out had also stated that they believed they had received enough information 
about the project. 
 
Bellevue respondents who stated that information had some impact on how the project 
turned out provided the following reasons for this response: 
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• Information is important for community members to be trained in matters related 
to the water project (this includes bookkeeping, maintenance and problem 
solving training); 
• Information is important for support for the implementer; and 
• Information regarding the project is essential since it is the community who will, 
ultimately, make use of the water source. 
These Bellevue respondents, furthermore, stated that they had either received more 
than enough information or enough information.  There was one outlier who stated that 
not enough information was made available about the water project. 
 
30 percent of Bellevue respondents stated that the amount of information had no 
impact on how the project turned out.  The sole reason these respondents gave for 
this response is: 
• Water access is free. 
These respondents stated that not enough information was made available to them.  
Only one respondent stated that more than enough information was made available 
to the community about the project.  As such, the response that “water access is 
free” can, tentatively, be ascribed to (a) respondents not seeing a connection 
between the amount of information and how the project turned out, or (b) 
respondents believing that it is every person’s right to have free water access and 
that the amount of information is not linked to this since this right needs to be fulfilled 
one way or another. 
 
In Mamogolo, respondents (N=11) who stated that the amount of information had 
made a big impact on how the project turned out provided the following reasons: 
• It is believed that the amount of information received from the implementer 
resulted in service delivery (water provision) to the community (9 respondents 
out of 11, 81.8%); 
• Information helps in resolving problems, eg to ensure that a section of the 
village was not left out of the project; and 
• Information contributes to ensuring that water is provided equally, i.e. no 
households are left out. 
Six of the respondents stated that they believed they had received more than enough 
information about the water project.  Four respondents stated they believed they had 
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received enough information; one respondent stated that he/she had received some 
information. 
 
In Nwamitwa, respondents (N=4) stated that the amount of information had made a big 
impact on how the project turned, providing the following reasons for the response: 
• The community supports the municipality/implementer when a lot of information 
is provided; 
• Information contributes to the community developing an understanding of the 
project and sympathy for the project implementer when things do not turn out as 
planned/stated; and 
• If a member of the community does not understand something related to the 
project, he/she can get information regarding this. 
These respondents either stated that he/she had received enough information, some 
information, or not enough information. 
 
Respondents (N=2) who stated that information had some impact on how the project 
turned out provided the following reasons for this response: 
• Information had contributed to water points being moved closer so that 
households have easier access to water; 
• Information had some impact because sometimes the implementer gave 
information that did not realise, e.g. the implementer said people would have 
water once a week but in reality some people receive water only once a month; 
and 
• If correct information had been given “no one would’ve agreed to the project” as 
it was established. 
The above respondents stated that he/she either received enough information or some 
information. 
 
Some respondents (N=4) stated that the amount of information made available had a 
small impact on how the project turned out.  The reasons provided for this response is 
as follows: 
• People had access to water for only one month; 
• When people do have access to water, it is “maybe twice a week”; 
• Distances between standpipes are very far; 
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• The project infrastructure is not being taken care of; and 
• Some residents have approached the councilor about the state of the project, 
but the councilor had (at that stage) not come back to the community. 
Three of the above respondents stated that they believed they had received only some 
information; one respondent stated that he/she had received more than enough 
information. 
 
In Tours, two respondents (out of 8) stated that the amount of information made 
available to the community had a big impact on how the project turned out.  It must be 
highlighted, first, that both the respondents stated they believed they had received 
some information.  The reasons given for the response that information had a big 
impact on how the project turned out, are: 
• If the municipality had utilised community knowledge about where the old water 
lines were lain, this line system could have been incorporated into the new 
water project; and 
• More than enough information, it is believed, would have ensured that the 
community receives water after the project was finished. 
 
Four respondents stated that they believed the amount of information received had a 
small impact on how the project turned out.  The reason for this response is mainly: 
• That the community does not have adequate access to water even after the 
project was established. 
These respondents also stated that they believed they had received some information 
or not enough information. 
 
Two respondents stated that they believed that the amount of information had no 
impact on how the project turned out.  The reason given is: 
• That there is still not adequate access to water in the village. 
The respondents stated that they received some information or not enough 
information. 
 
5.3.3 The relationship between inclusion and accountability 
Within the section related to the inclusion and engagement of the community by the 
implementer, respondents were provided with a definition about being included in the 
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project.  Respondents were asked to keep this definition in mind when answering the 
three questions within the section.  The definition read as follows: 
 
“Inclusion in the project process means the implementer kept continuous contact 
with you in order to make sure it took your needs and interests into 
consideration”. 
 
According to this definition, respondents were asked to what degree they felt included 
in the project process.  Bellevue indicated that 70 percent of respondents felt included 
throughout the project; 20 percent felt included for most of the project; and 10 percent 
did not feel included.  Mamagolo felt 81.8 percent included throughout the project with 
an 18.2 percent of feeling included for most of the project.  Nwamitwa respondents 
indicated that 30 percent of respondents felt included in the project; 40 percent felt 
included sometimes; and 30 percent did not feel included.  Tours indicated that 25 
percent felt included sometimes; 75 percent of respondents did not feel included.  
These percentages are illustrated in figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Q37: Level of inclusion in the project process H0 (Inclusion is equal) 
rejected, Χ2=30.6, df=9. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% probability 
level. 
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Respondents were also asked to highlight how often they were able to contribute their 
ideas about the project (Figure 12).  This question served as a means of evaluating 
whether the implementer allowed opportunity for respondents to participate in the 
project process, thereby substantiating respondents’ belief of inclusion.   
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In Bellevue, 50 percent of responses indicated that respondents could contribute their 
ideas at any time during the project.  40 percent indicated that they could contribute 
their ideas most of the time during the project.  10 percent stated that they did were 
not able to contribute their ideas. 
 
Mamagolo indicated 45.5 percent agreement that ideas could be given at any time in 
the project; 54.5 percent showed that they could contribute their ideas most of the 
time. 
 
30 percent of Nwamitwa respondents believe they could contribute their ideas at any 
time; 10 percent believe they could give ideas most of the time; 40 percent believe 
they could contribute ideas sometimes; and 20 percent felt they were never able to 
give their ideas about the project. 
 
Tours indicated that 62.5 percent of respondents believed that they could sometimes 
give their ideas about the project; 37.5 percent felt they were never able to give their 
ideas. 
 
Figure 12. Q38: Community contribution in ideas. H0 (Contribution is equal between 
villages) rejected, Χ2=26.7, df=9. The perceptions between villages differ on a 99% 
probability level. 
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Respondents were asked what items were utilised by the implementer to include the 
community in the project (table 10 p86).  It is of interest to note that the municipal 
projects indicate higher values (considering the average figures) for six of the ten 
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items.  The items relating to the contact person, project reports, feedback forms and 
ensuring illiterate community members are included, scored lower values than the 
NGO score (but not remarkably so). 
 
Table 10 Methods to include the community 
 Bellevue  
 
(%) 
Mamogolo
 
(%) 
NGO  
Average  
(%) 
Nwamitwa
 
(%) 
Tours 
 
(%) 
Municipality 
Average 
(%) 
Discussions 50.0 81.8 65.9 80.0 87.5 83.8 
Community 
Meeting 
100.0 90.9 95.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Contact 
Person 
70.0 100.0 85.0 80.0 75.0 77.5 
Project 
reports 
60.0 90.9 75.5 70.0 50.0 60.0 
Feedback 
Forms 
50.0 36.3 43.2 60.0 25.0 42.5 
Translator 60.0 100.0 80.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Include  
illiterate 
60.0 100.0 80.0 80.0 75.0 77.5 
Equal  
inclusion 
60.0 100.0 80.0 100.0 87.5 93.8 
Vote 50.0 45.5 47.8 70.0 75.0 72.5 
Veto 30.0 45.5 37.8 90.0 75.0 82.5 
 
Q9-14 also measured the manner in which the project implementer included others in 
the project, be this because (a) it will lead to improved expertise in order to establish a 
project or (b) the implementer believes it should include the community in the project.  
The analysis focused on how the community was included in the project.  For this 
reason, Q11, Q12 and Q13 are highlighted. 
 
Q11 measured respondents’ perception of being involved in the project process.  
Perceptions reveal that all four villages believe they were involved (table 11). 
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Table 11  Community involvement by locality (village) 
  Village of Respondent 
  Bellevue 
(N) 
Mamagolo 
(N) 
Nwamitwa 
(N) 
Tours 
(N) 
Total  
(N) 
Strongly Agree 8 11 8 1 28
Agree 2 0 2 5 9
Disagree 0 0 0 1 1
Strongly Disagree 0 0 0 1 1
Q11 Community was 
involved in project process 
Total 10 11 10 8 39
 
Q12 asked whether the community believed they were consulted about the project 
(table 12).  Findings reveal that Bellevue, Mamogolo and Nwamitwa believe they were 
consulted.  Tours indicate that four respondents believe they were consulted, whilst 
the other disagree with this. 
 
Table 12 Community consultation by locality (village) 
  Village of Respondent 
  Bellevue 
(N) 
Mamagolo 
(N) 
Nwamitwa 
(N) 
Tours 
(N) 
Total  
(N) 
Strongly Agree 10 11 7 1 29
Agree 0 0 0 3 3
Disagree 0 0 1 2 3
Strongly Disagree 0 0 0 2 2
Don't Know 0 0 1 0 1
Q12 Community was 
consulted about project 
Total 10 11 9 8 38
 
Q13 aimed to find out whether the community was able to approach the implementer 
with comments/ideas/concerns about the project (table 13).  Bellevue, Mamogolo and 
Nwamitwa agreed with the statement.  Tours, once again, indicated that four 
respondents agreed with the statement, whilst the other four disagreed. 
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Table 13 Implementer accessibility to community 
  Village of Respondent 
  Bellevue 
(N) 
Mamagolo 
(N) 
Nwamitwa 
(N) 
Tours 
(N) 
Total 
(N) 
Strongly Agree 10 11 6 0 27
Agree 0 0 1 4 5
Disagree 0 0 2 3 5
Strongly Disagree 0 0 0 1 1
Don't Know 0 0 1 0 1
Q13 Implementer was 
accessible to community for 
any 
comments/ideas/concerns 
Total 10 11 10 8 39
 
5.3.4  The relationship between sanctioning and accountability  
This section was considered, prior to any surveys, to be very important in determining 
the level of accountability as practiced by each implementer.  The section was detailed 
in its evaluation of sanctioning within a water project.  Respondents were, firstly, asked 
whether there had been a very serious problem within the project where the 
community wished to halt the project until the issue was resolved.   
 
A respondent would, on responding ‘yes’, be asked what the problem had been.  The 
section then continued to include questions related to whether (a) the project was 
brought to a halt in order to solve this issue, (b) it was the community, the 
implementer, the contractor, DWAF, or another actor who stopped the project, (c) the 
project was brought to a halt immediately, (d) the issue was resolved before the 
project was finished, (e) there were people from the implementer’s side who did not 
believe it was necessary to halt the project, and (f) reasons for not wanting to halt the 
project were related to, for example, economic motivation.   
 
Even when a respondent did not believe there ever was a very serious issue to be 
resolved, every respondent was asked to evaluate whether he/she believed it would 
be easy to bring a project to a halt.  This question aimed to measure whether a 
sanctioning mechanism was present within a project process, even if this mechanism 
did not need to be utilized. 
Despite the expectation that respondents would “spill the beans” in this section, it was 
enlightening that a very low number of respondents believed that there had ever been 
a very serious problem in the project process which needed to be resolved. 
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In Bellevue, Mamogolo and Tours, two respondents from each village indicated that 
there was a serious problem during the project where the community wished to halt 
the project until the issue was resolved.  It was decided, as a result of the low number 
of respondents indicating a wish to halt the project, that confident analysis of this 
section would be difficult.  As such, only tentative findings are stated. 
 
In Bellevue the problem identified related to (a) the payment of workers and (b) to 
workers being unable to dig a trench in a very rocky area.  Similar, in Mamogolo the 
serious problem identified related to the payment of workers at the beginning of the 
project.  In Tours, on the other hand, the problem related to (a) the contractor not 
asking permission from the chief to start construction and (b) the contractor not testing 
the lines to verify that water actually flowed.   
 
Certainly, the identified problems are all serious.  However, in both Bellevue and 
Mamogolo the problems were resolved before the project was finished.  In Tours, it 
appears as if the issue of the contractor not taking into consideration that respect have 
to be shown to the chief by asking permission for construction was also resolved.  In 
Tours, however, the issue of not testing the lines does not seem to have been 
resolved (with only three standpipes functioning in the village despite lower-lying 
villages having adequate access to water).  Tours appears, thus, not to have been 
able to sanction the project implementer (or the contractor). This is, to emphasise, only 
a tentative conclusion about the situation in Tours. 
 
5.3.5  The relationship between credibility and accountability 
This section evaluated the credibility of the implementer as perceived by 
respondents.  This element aims to determine whether respondents would 
recommend an implementer to another community in order to establish a water 
project; and also, why they would recommend a project implementer to another 
community. 
 
Respondents in Bellevue and Mamogolo indicated that all respondents would 
recommend the project implementer to another community (table 14).  In Nwamitwa 
seven respondents stated they would recommend the project implementer.  In Tours, 
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five of the eight respondents indicated they would not recommend the project 
implementer to another community. 
 
Table 14 Recommendation of project implementer to other communities (N) 
 Yes No Total number of 
respondents 
Bellevue 10 0 10 
Mamogolo 11 0 11 
Nwamitwa 7 3 10 
Tours 3 5 8 
 
Ideally, if respondents stated that they would recommend a project implementer, the 
motivation would be that the community receives water because of the project.  
However, the study included other items to determine whether items, besides water 
access, have a higher “regard” within a village.   
 
Four set motivational responses were provided to respondents.  These responses 
included recommending the implementer because: 
(a) the implementer consists of people who are important people; 
(b) the community has water since the project was completed; 
(c) the implementer can provide jobs to the community while the project is completed; 
and 
(d) the implementer has good morals characteristics. 
 
These four responses incorporated reference to power, service delivery (actual 
outcome), economic opportunity, and moral values.  An option was also given to 
respondents to provide an alternative response (“other”) if the respondent did not 
agree with one of the four set responses.  Take note that respondents were allowed to 
choose only one option.  This is believed to ensure that a respondent would choose 
the most “important” option to him/her. 
 
From Table 15 it is apparent that a majority of Bellevue respondents would 
recommend the project implementer because they now have water access.  This is a 
response linking directly with why respondents would recommend a water project 
implementer.  In Mamogolo, five respondents indicated they would recommend the 
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implementer because of water access (this is a 45% response compared to a 70% 
response from Bellevue). 
 
Table 15 Reason for recommendation of project implementer 
  Village of Respondent 
  Bellevue 
(N) 
Mamagolo 
(N) 
Nwamitwa 
(N) 
Tours 
(N) 
Total 
(N) 
Implementers are 
important people 
1 0 1 0 2
Have had water every 
day since project finished
7 3 0 0 10
Implementer can provide 
jobs to community for 
duration of project 
2 4 4 2 12
Implementer has good 
moral charactersitics 
0 1 1 0 2
Other 0 3 1 1 5
Q51 Why would you 
recommend 
implementer? 
Total 10 11 7 3 31
 
 
Figure 13 Visual representation of Table 15 (N)   
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Only two respondents from Bellevue stated that they would recommend the project 
implementer because the project could provide employment to community members.  
The other three villages, however, indicated that a large majority of respondents would 
recommend the implementer because of possible employment during a project.   
 
Respondents were allowed to provide a reason of their own choosing about why they 
would recommend a project implementer.  In Mamogolo, one respondent indicated 
that he/she would recommend the implementer because the implementer (later) 
established a sanitation project in the village.  The respondent in Nwamitwa indicated 
that he/she would recommend the implementer because he/she would like other 
people to have water, even if it is only once a week.  The respondent in Tours stated 
that he/she would recommend the implementer to another community because this 
might result in the implementer utilising a new idea in that village that results in people 
having access to water on a continued basis.  This new idea could then be initiated in 
Tours, resulting in the village having adequate water access. 
 
After responses were evaluated relating to the above two questions, respondents were 
asked to provide agreement or disagreement with actions and decisions of the 
implementer in the project process.  These questions included 12 references to the 
“character” of the implementer during the project.   
 
Six questions were employed to evaluate positive characteristics of the implementer.  
The other six remaining questions were used to confirm the responses of the first six 
questions.  For example, Q53 asked respondents whether the implementer appeared 
to be working hard to finish the project.  Q53’s “testing” question was Q59.  Q59 asked 
respondents whether people from the implementer would, for example, arrive late for 
work on the project a number of times or would take very long lunch breaks.  For 
example, if a respondent agreed with Q53, then the same respondent would have to 
provide a “disagree” response at Q59 in order for the implementer-characteristic to be 
seen as reliable.   
 
Six questions aimed to determine whether the implementer (a) showed interest in the 
community’s needs, (b) appeared to be working hard to finish the project, (c) showed 
knowledge in how to establish the project, (d) appeared to make the project a priority 
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in its operation, (e) thought ahead about possible consequences for each decision 
and/or action, and (f) consulted other experts in order to successfully establish the 
project. 
 
 These questions measured belief in the implementer’s competency, commitment, and 
sense of providing the best possible service through contemplating possible 
consequences of decisions and making use of input from other experts in the field of 
water provision. 
 
In this regard, Bellevue and Mamogolo showed 100 percent agreement that the 
implementer showed interest in the community’s needs (Figure 14).  Nwamitwa 
indicated 90 percent agreement with the statement; whilst Tours showed only 12.5 
percent agreement. 
 
Figure 14. Q52. Implementer showed interest in the community needs. H0 (Showed 
interest is equal) rejected, Χ2=29.3, df=9. The perceptions between villages differ on a 
99% probability level. 
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Bellevue and Mamogolo, furthermore, indicated 100 percent agreement that the 
implementer had appeared to be working hard to finish the project.  Nwamitwa also 
indicated a very high score, with 90 percent agreement.  Tours showed 75 percent 
disagreement with the statement (figure 15). 
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Figure 15. Q53. Implementer appeared to working hard to finish the project. H0 (Hard 
working is equal) rejected, Χ2=29.3, df=9. The perceptions between villages differ on a 
99% probability level. 
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Bellevue and Mamogolo indicate 100 percent believe that the implementer showed 
knowledge in how to establish a project (Figure 16).  Nwamitwa showed 70 percent 
agreement and Tours 14.3 percent agreement.  A number of Tours respondents made 
mention of their belief that the contractor never tested the water lines to see whether 
water was flowing.  This belief may have played a large role in determining Tours’ 
response on whether the implementer showed knowledge in how to establish a 
project. 
Figure 16. Q54. Implementer showed knowledge to establish the project. H0 
(Knowledge) rejected, Χ2=19.4, df=8. The perceptions between villages differ on a 
95% probability level. 
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Bellevue, Mamogolo and Nwamitwa all indicated between 70 to 100% agreement that 
the implementer appeared to make the project a priority in its operation (Figure 17).  
Tours indicated 25.5 percent agreement with the statement. 
 
Figure 17. Q55. Implementer showed priority in the project. H0 (Priority is equal) 
rejected, Χ2=18.0, df=8. The perceptions between villages differ on a 95% probability 
level. 
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Figure 18. Q56. Implementer took consequences into consideration. H0 
(Consequences is equal) rejected, Χ2=21.4, df=9. The perceptions between villages 
differ on a 95% probability level. 
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Bellevue indicated 90 percent agreement that the implementer considered possible 
consequences for each decision and/or action (Figure 18); Mamogolo showed 100 
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percent agreement; Nwamitwa 50 percent agreement; and Tours 57.1 percent 
agreement. 
 
Bellevue indicated 100 percent agreement that the implementer consulted other experts 
in order to successfully establish the project (Figure 19).  Mamogolo indicated 27.3 
percent agreement.  A number of respondents were of the opinion that Tsogang (NGO) 
was the expert and, therefore, did not need to consult with other experts.  Nwamitwa 
indicated 88.9 percent agreement with the statement and Tours indicated 50 percent 
agreement. 
 
Figure 19. Q57. Implementer consulted other experts on the project. H0 (Consultation is 
equal) rejected, Χ2=18.0, df=8. The perceptions between villages differ on a 95% 
probability level. 
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5.4  Overall analysis of data 
Non-parametric methods were utilised in order to present an overall analysis of the data.  
Tests revealed that between the two systems (NGO and Municipality) there are 
significant differences for the questions relating to Information, Inclusion, Sustainability 
(Q1-8, Q19-24), and Overall Accountability (Q1-64) (Table 16).  Q70 (Political 
Accountability) measured accountability of an implementer without taking into 
consideration Q1-8 and Q19-24, which measures the implementer’s responsibility.  The 
Mean Rank indicates that for Inclusion, Information, Sustainability and Overall 
Accountability, the NGO system performed much better than the Municipality system. 
 92
 
Table 16. Comparison between NGO and the Municipality (Mann-Whitney 
Test) 
 
 Q80 System N Mean Rank Mann-Whitney U 
NGO 21 11.10  
Municipality 18 30.39  
Q70 Political Account 
Total 39  2 ***1) 
NGO 21 11.52  
Municipality 18 29.89  
Q71 Overall Account 
Total 39  11 *** 
NGO 21 12.14  
Municipality 18 29.17  
Q73 Sustainability 
Total 39  24*** 
NGO 21 13.71  
Municipality 18 27.33  
Q74 Inclusion 
Total 39  57 *** 
NGO 21 15.90  
Municipality 18 24.78  
Q76 Accountability 
Total 39  103 **2) 
NGO 21 17.14  
Municipality 18 23.33  
Q78 Credibility 
Total 39  129 
NGO 21 20.71  
Municipality 18 19.17  
Q79 Sanctioning 
Total 39  174 
NGO 21 14.36  
Municipality 18 26.58  
Q77 Information 
Total 39  70.5 *** 
1) Significant on 99% level. 2) Significant on 95% level 
 
Analyses within a system (NGO Bellevue compared to NGO Mamogolo; 
Municipality Nwamitwa compared to Municipality Tours) were also done.  Findings 
reveal that for the NGO system there are no significant differences between the 
perceptions of Bellevue and Mamogolo.  However, the Mean Rank indicates that 
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Bellevue provides the best Overall Accountability between the projects.  Bellevue’s 
Mean Rank also shows that for Sustainability, Inclusion, and Credibility it is much 
lower than Mamogolo’s.  This means that on Sustainability, Inclusion, and 
Credibility, Bellevue performed also better than Mamogolo.  Mamogolo’s Mean 
Rank indicates that the village believes that it received the most information 
compared to the other villages. 
 
Table 17 Comparison between Bellevue and Mamogolo (NGO system) 
Ranks 
 Village of 
Respondent N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Bellevue 10 7.85 78.50 
Mamagolo 11 13.86 152.50 
Q71 Overall Account 
Total 21   
Bellevue 10 10.15 101.50 
Mamagolo 11 11.77 129.50 
Q73 Sustainability 
Total 21   
Bellevue 10 9.20 92.00 
Mamagolo 11 12.64 139.00 
Q74 Inclusion 
Total 21   
Bellevue 10 14.30 143.00 
Mamagolo 11 8.00 88.00 
Q77 Information 
Total 21   
Bellevue 10 8.30 83.00 
Mamagolo 11 13.45 148.00 
Q78 Credibility 
Total 21   
Bellevue 10 11.10 111.00 
Mamagolo 11 10.91 120.00 
Q79 Sanctioning 
Total 21   
 
 
Comparing Nwamitwa and Tours, it was found that the two Municipality villages differed 
significantly on Overall Accountability, Sustainability, and Credibility.  Nwamitwa’s Mean 
Rank indicates that this village’s perception regarding the identified elements is lower 
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than Tours’.  This makes Nwamitwa the ‘more accountable’ project of the two 
Municipality projects. 
 
Table 18 Comparison between Nwamitwa and Tours (municipality) 
Ranks 
 Village of 
Respondent N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Nwamitwa 10 6.00 60.00 
Tours 8 13.88 111.00 
Q71 Overall Account 
Total 18   
Nwamitwa 10 6.70 67.00 
Tours 8 13.00 104.00 
Q73 Sustainability 
Total 18   
Nwamitwa 10 7.70 77.00 
Tours 8 11.75 94.00 
Q74 Inclusion 
Total 18   
Nwamitwa 10 7.30 73.00 
Tours 8 12.25 98.00 
Q77 Information 
Total 18   
Nwamitwa 10 6.35 63.50 
Tours 8 13.44 107.50 
Q78 Credibility 
Total 18   
Nwamitwa 10 8.50 85.00 
Tours 8 10.75 86.00 
Q79 Sanctioning 
Total 18   
 
 
5.5  Overall Finding 
The above analyses contributed to an overall finding.  It has been stated in the Overall 
Analysis that (a) there is a significant difference between the two systems’ (NGO and 
Municipality) political accountability within their respective projects, (b) although not 
significant, Bellevue (NGO project) appears to be more Sustainable, Inclusive, Credible, 
and Overall Accountable within the project than Mamogolo (or the other projects for that 
matter), and (c) Nwamitwa (Municipality project) indicates better performance, compared 
to Tours, in Sustainability, Credibility, and Overall Accountability.   
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It can, therefore, be stated that the two NGO villages’ responses on the entire 
questionnaire indicates that the NGO system (or project implementer) acted in a 
politically accountable manner within the project.  In comparison, the Municipality 
villages’ responses indicate that the system (or project implementer) acted in a less 
politically accountable manner within the project.  Take note that Bellevue, Mamogolo 
and Nwamitwa all indicated significantly that they believed the project implementer had 
been accountable in the project (see table 17as well as figure 20).  Tours has been an 
outlier in most of the findings.  This indicates a very negative perception of the project 
implementer by this group of respondents. 
 
Table 19 Implementer was accountable in project (Q16) 
  Village of Respondent 
  Bellevue 
(N) 
Mamagolo 
(N) 
Nwamitwa 
(N) 
Tours 
(N) 
Total 
(N) 
Strongly Agree 7 10 6 1 24
Agree 3 0 0 3 6
Disagree 0 0 4 3 7
Strongly Disagree 0 0 0 1 1
Don't Know 0 1 0 0 1
Q16 Implementer was 
accountable in project 
Total 10 11 10 8 39
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Figure 20. Visual representation of Table 19 
 
The Overall Analyses, therefore, provides a confirmation of the Exploratory Analysis 
depicted in the Tree-and-Leaf graphs.  When taking into consideration the Tree-and-
Leaf graph depicting the Overall Sustainability of each project, it is illustrated that in 
the case where a village indicates a high level of project sustainability, that village’s 
overall findings on political accountability is directly related.  Thus, the research 
question ‘Is there any political accountability in water projects and does political 
accountability impact project sustainability?’ is answered by arguing that (a) there 
is a difference between the two systems (involved in water project implementation) 
with regards to political accountability.  The NGO project implementer indicates a 
higher level of political accountability in a project in contrast to the Municipality project 
implementer and (b) political accountability impacts project sustainability. 
 
From the above a recommendation is made that both systems re-evaluate the position 
that Inclusion, Information, and Overall Accountability have within their operations, 
thereby improving project sustainability. 
 
In summary, analyses indicate there is a significant difference between the NGO and 
municipality projects with regards to the degree of political accountability practiced.  
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The NGO projects indicate that for the variables responsibility (specifically questions 
focused on sustainability), information, inclusion, and overall accountability, the NGO 
project implementer appeared to be more accountable.  This is not to say that the 
municipality projects do not show relatively high scores on these variables.  It is 
believed the difference between the two systems (NGO and municipality) is 
significantly revealed when considering the reasons why information is provided and 
how the community is included.   
 
The NGO projects also indicate a higher degree of sustainability.  These projects 
provide water either every day or, at least, 2-4 days each week.  This is in contrast to 
the municipality projects where respondents indicated that water access is less than 2 
days each week.  Naturally, when a project implementer has not fulfilled its duty to 
provide a stated responsibility (providing water) it is indicating a lower degree of 
accountability than would be the case otherwise. 
 
It was interesting, and perhaps encouraging, that findings revealed that communities 
believe there was never a serious problem during a project where the community 
wanted to halt the project until this issue was resolved.  However, this mechanism of 
accountability should remain within any measurement of the concept.  This ensures 
that the option is also available to a community to halt a project when a serious issue 
arises. 
 
All the projects (with the exception of Tours) showed relatively high belief that the 
project implementer can be viewed as credible.  It should be noted that credibility, on 
its own, does not ensure a desired project outcome (sustainability).  This can only 
come through pursuing all the elements of political accountability. 
 
In essence, it is stated again that (a) there is a difference between the two systems 
(involved in water project implementation) with regards to political accountability.  The 
NGO project implementer indicates a higher level of political accountability in a project 
in contrast to the municipality project implementer and (b) political accountability 
impacts project sustainability. 
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CHAPTER 6: Conclusion 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Chapter 1 (Introduction) argued that citizens have a need to believe they can influence 
and evaluate the decisions and behaviour of decision-makers.  This need to influence 
and evaluate decision-makers’ actions was linked to water projects in the presented 
study.  In this line, citizens want to be able to (a) influence decision-makers during a 
project via participatory measures, and (b) evaluate first, the project outcome and 
second, the manner in which a implementer has acted during the project. 
 
In the study, five selected elements were utilised in order to measure political 
accountability within water projects.  These elements allow citizens to influence 
(element: inclusion) and evaluate decision-makers and the project outcome (elements: 
responsibility, inclusion, information, sanctioning, and credibility). 
 
Citizens’ need to influence and evaluate project implementers presented an overall 
finding of political accountability within water projects.  The research question asked 
(a) how political accountable are project implementers in water projects, and (b) what 
is the impact of political accountability on project sustainability?  Findings revealed that 
for the elements Inclusion, Information, Sustainability (or responsibility to delivery 
sustainable services), and Overall Accountability, there is a significant difference 
between the two systems (NGO and Municipality).  The NGO projects indicate a much 
higher Overall Accountability within the projects.  Overall Accountability indicates a 
higher value within the NGO projects as a result of a significant difference between the 
two systems on the elements Inclusion, Information, and Sustainability (responsibility 
to provide sustainable services).  Furthermore, even though the municipal projects 
indicated relative strong agreement with Inclusion and Information questions, the NGO 
projects showed much stronger agreement.   
 
Especially on the Information and Sustainability elements the following needs to be 
highlighted:  
• Q35 and Q36 asked respondents whether they believed the amount of 
information they received had made an impact on how the project turned out 
and to motivate their answer.  It is noteworthy that NGO project respondents (a) 
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agreed with the statement, and (b) believed information is essential in order to 
solve problems and allow the project implementer and community members to 
work together effectively.  In contrast, the municipality project respondents 
linked the importance of information to encouraging support and sympathy for 
the project implementer.  This is a significant finding in the sense that NGO 
project respondents’ relationship with the project implementer was/is of such a 
nature that it is (a) an equal partnership between the community and the project 
implementer in establishing the project, and (b) respondents realise that during 
a project problems will, most probably, appear which are solved through 
information and a relationship with the project implementer; 
• There is a remarkable difference between responses on Sustainability between 
the two systems (NGO and Municipality).  NGO project respondents indicated 
strong agreement that water is provided to the community even after the project 
has been finished for more than seven years (Bellevue).  Bellevue also 
indicated that water is available each day of the week, despite the project 
providing water to a lot more households than it was designed for.  Mamogolo 
has water access 2-4 days per week.  This is the result of the community not 
able or willing to purchase more diesoline once the municipal-provided 
diesoline is finished.  The NGO project respondents, furthermore, indicated 
they believed the project implementer met its responsibility to the community 
fully or, at least, most of it.  The above findings are in contrast to the 
Municipality project respondents. 
  
Figure 1 and 2, Chapter 5, provide appropriate illustration that the level of political 
accountability practiced within a water project is directly related to a project’s 
sustainability. 
  
Thus, it can be stated that  
• political accountability within a water project is dependent on the implementing 
institution; 
• the NGO project implementer shows a higher level of political accountability 
within its project implementation; and  
• political accountability impacts project sustainability. 
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Therefore, H0 (There is no link between political accountability within a water project 
and water sustainability) is rejected. 
 
The selection of five elements measuring political accountability allows the 
measurement to be utilised in other projects.  These projects need not be related to 
water provision.  The study thereby contributes to (a) measuring an essential principle 
of democracy and (b) confirming that political accountability is essential if project 
implementers aim to provide sustainable project outcomes.  The study therefore 
contributes to (a) South African literature measuring political accountability through the 
identification of elements that are essential for projects to be described as 
accountable, (b) understanding the importance of inclusion, information, and 
responsibility in order to improve project sustainability, and (c) a measurement tool in 
order to determine the degree of political accountability found in a project.  As far as is 
known, this is the first study to measure political accountability in water projects. 
 
Recommendations 
 
• Project implementers need to re-evaluate the relationship they foster with 
community members/project beneficiaries.  This is accomplished through 
improved inclusion of project beneficiaries and providing reliable and regular 
information to project beneficiaries.  A closer relationship between the 
community and the project implementer provides (a) trust between the two 
parties, (b) decisions to be implemented promptly and effectively, (c) issues to 
be resolved during the project, and (d) continued support of the project 
implementer even after the project is finished. 
• Project implementers need to realise the importance of community training 
(ability to perform minor maintenance on project) during projects as a 
mechanism to (a) improve the inclusion of the community in a project, and (b) 
ensure that minor problems, such as leaking taps or lines, can be fixed 
promptly without the community having to rely on the project implementer to 
resolve such issues. 
• The five elements of political accountability need to enjoy equal importance 
within a project.  One or two elements cannot be pursued at the expense of the 
other elements.   
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• Lastly, whenever a project implementer employs an outside expert to assist 
with water provision, it is imperative that this third party also establishes a 
strong relationship with the community.  What is evident is that a closer 
relationship between actors allows the resolution of issues promptly and 
effectively, thereby ensuring that a project can continue to be implemented. 
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Appendix A 
COMMUNITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
A.   RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Mark as many items as you believe the implementer ensured 
 STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW DISAGREE 
STRONGLY
DISAGREE 
Q1.     Water is provided to the 
community 1 2 9 3 4 
Q2.     Water provision is provided 
equally to all people within the 
community 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q3.     Water is provided 
24hours/7days a week 1 2 9 3 4 
Q4.     Water infrastructure looks to be 
           according to engineering 
           recommendations 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Q5.     The project has provided water 
for 
           many years 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q6.     The implementer ensured the 
water is 
           safe for people to drink and use
1 2 9 3 4 
Q7.     The implementer ensured the 
           environment was not harmed 
           when the project was 
established 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q8.     The implementer provides 
water at an 
           affordable tariff 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Q9.     The project forms part of water 
           provision to the entire district 1 2 9 3 4 
Q10.   The implementer used partners 
in 
           order to establish the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q11.   The community was involved in 
the 
           project process 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q12.   The community was consulted 
about 
           the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q13.   The implementer was 
accessible to 
           the community for any 
           comments/ideas/concerns 
during and 
           after the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q14.   The implementer was open to 
new 
           ideas in order to successfully 
           establish the project  
1 2 9 3 4 
      
Q15.   The implementer ensured the 
project 
           was established through good 
           governance 
1 2 9 3 4 
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Q16.   The implementer was 
accountable in 
           the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
      
Q17.   The implementer provided 
information  
           about the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q18.   The implementer exhibited 
openness 
           about its actions, behaviour 
and 
           decisions in the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
       YES          NO 
Q19.     Did you receive water?         1           0 
IF YES, go to Q20. IF NO, go to Q24.  
Q20.     Did you start getting water on the promised date that the project 
said you 
             would have access?  
        1           0 
 
 DID 
NOT 
WAIT 
1 -3 
MONTHS
DON’T 
KNOW 
3 – 6  
MONTHS LONGER
Q21.   How long did you wait for water 
access? 1 2 9 3 4 
 
 1 – 12 
MONTHS
1 - 2 
YEARS 
DON’T 
KNOW 
2 – 3 
YEARS 
LONGER
(Specify)
Q22.   Since starting to receive water, for 
how 
           long after this did you continue to 
receive 
           water? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 LESS THAN 
2 DAYS A 
WEEK 
2 – 4 DAYS 
A WEEK 
DON’T 
KNOW 
4 – 6 
DAYS A 
WEEK 
7 DAYS 
PER 
WEEK 
Q23.   For how long do you have 
          access to water each week? 1 2 9 3 4 
 
 MET IT 
FULLY 
MET MOST 
OF IT 
DON’T 
KNOW 
MET PART 
OF IT 
DID NOT 
MEET IT AT 
ALL 
Q24.   How well do you think the  
          implementer met its 
          responsibility to you? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
B.   INFORMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Mark the type of information that was made available to you by the implementer about the 
water project. 
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 STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW DISAGREE 
STRONGLY
DISAGREE 
Q25.   Information about the type 
          (standpipes/in-
house/borehole/other)   of water 
provision 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q26.   Information about how this 
water 
           provision will take place 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q27.   Information about how the 
project 
          “turned out” 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q28.   Information about the 
implementer 
           persons involved in the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q29.   You know who the person is 
who 
           keeps communication open 
between 
           the community and the 
implementer 
           with regards to this project 
(contact  
           person/CLO) 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q30.    If there is a maintenance 
problem 
           with a number of households’ 
water 
           provision, you can contact 
someone 
           from the implementer in order 
to 
           solve the problem 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q31.    The implementer 
communicated to 
            you whether you will need to 
pay 
            water tariffs in order for 
maintenance 
            in this water project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q32.     Other 
 1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
MORE 
THAN 
ENOUGH 
ENOUGH DON’T KNOW SOME 
NOT 
ENOUGH 
Q33.   Thinking in general, rate the amount 
of 
           information made available to you 
about 
           the water project 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Q34.     Please mark the methods used by the implementer to make the information available to 
you 
Community meeting         1 
Pamphlets         2 
Notices in local newspaper         3 
Announcements made by the contact person/CLO         4 
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Discussion meetings with the implementer         5 
Project reports         6 
People from the implementer going from door-to-door to talk about the project         7 
Other (e.g. chief)         8 
None         9 
 
 BIG IMPACT 
SOME 
IMPACT
DON’T 
KNOW 
SMALL 
IMPACT 
NO 
IMPACT 
Q35.   What impact did the amount of 
information 
           made available to you have on how 
the  
           water project “turned out”? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Q36.   Why do you say this? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
C.   INCLUSION, ENGAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Let us say that being included in the project process means the implementer kept continuous 
contact with you in order to make sure it took your needs and interests into consideration. Keeping 
this definition of being included in mind, please answer the following questions. 
 
 THROUGHOUTPROJECT 
FOR 
MOST OF 
PROJECT
DON’T 
KNOW 
PART OF 
PROJECT 
NOT 
INCLUDED
Q37.   To what degree did you 
feel you 
           were included in the 
project process? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
AT 
ANY 
TIME 
MOST 
OF THE 
TIME 
DON’T 
KNOW SOMETIMES NEVER
Q38.   How often were you able to 
contribute your 
           ideas about the project? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Q39.     Please mark the items used by the implementer in the project process 
Discussion forums         1 
Community meetings         2 
Contact person(s)         3 
Project reports (information about how the project is progressing)         4 
Feedback forms (the implementer asking you how you perceive the project’s         5 
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development) 
Translator         6 
The implementer made an effort to assist illiterate people so that they too could be part 
of what  
was happening in the project 
        7 
Everyone in the community was able to be part of the process (for example, both men 
and women were included in community meetings) 
        8 
The community could vote about suggestions made about the project         9 
The community could reject suggestions to show disagreement with suggestions        10 
 
 
D.   SANCTIONING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 YES NO 
Q40.   In your community’s water project, was there at any time a serious 
problem  
           with the project where your community wished to halt the project until 
the  
           problem was resolved? 
1 0 
IF YES, go to Q41. IF NO, go to Q49. 
 
 
 
 
Q41.   What was the problem? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 YES NO 
Q42.   Was the project brought to a stop in order to solve the problem? 1 0 
IF YES, go to Q43. IF NO, go to Q45. 
 
Q43.     Who stopped the project? 
The community         1 
The implementer         2 
The engineering contractor         3 
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry         4 
Other (please specify)         5 
      
 IMMEDIATELY 1 – 3 MONTHS
DON’T 
KNOW 
3 – 6 
MONTHS
LONGER
(Specify)
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Q44.   How long after the problem was 
“voiced” 
           was the project stopped? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 YES NO 
Q45.   Was the problem resolved before the project was finished? 1 0 
Q46.   Were their people from the implementer’s side who did not think it was 
           necessary to halt the project? 1 0 
IF YES, go to Q47. IF NO, go to Q49. 
 
Q47.     What positions did these people hold within the implanter structure? 
Contractor         1 
Politicians          2 
Administrations officials         3 
People who were hired to, for example, dig trenches for the pipes         4 
Other (please specify)         5 
 
Q48.     What were the reasons for not wanting to halt the project? 
Halting the project would mean losing money         1 
It was thought the issue was not important         2 
The project was already behind schedule         3 
It was said the issue could be resolved while the project continued         4 
Other (please specify)         5 
 
 
 VERY EASY 
RELATIVELY 
EASY 
DON’T 
KNOW 
NOT 
THAT 
EASY 
DIFFICULT
Q49.   How easy, would you say is it to 
bring a 
           project to a halt in order to resolve 
an 
           issue? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
E.   CREDIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 YES NO 
Q50.   Would you recommend this project implementer to another 
community? 1 0 
IF YES, go to Q51. IF NO, go to Q52. 
 
Q51.     Why would you recommend the implementer (choose one answer) 
The implementer consists of people who are important people         1 
We have water every day since the project finished         2 
The implementer can provide jobs to the community while the project is established         3 
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The implementer has good moral characteristics         4 
Other (please specify)         5 
 
Please mark the characteristics the implementer displayed during the project process 
 STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW DISAGREE 
STRONGLY
DISAGREE 
Q52.   Showed interest in your needs 1 2 9 3 4 
Q53.   Appeared to be working hard to 
finish  
           the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q54.   Showed knowledge in how to  
           establish the project 1 2 9 3 4 
Q55.   Appeared to make the project a 
           priority in its operation 1 2 9 3 4 
Q56.   Thought ahead about possible 
           consequences for each 
decision and/ 
           or action 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q57.   Consulted other experts in 
order to 
           successfully establish the 
project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q58.   The implementer became 
annoyed  
           when the community 
communicated its 
           needs to the implementer 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q59.   People from the implementer 
would,  
           for example, arrive late for work 
on the 
           project a number of times or 
would 
           take very long lunch breaks 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q60.   Work on the project sometimes 
needed to  
           To be done again because, for  
example, the wrong size pipes were 
laid and 
           needed to be replaced 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q61.   The implementer would, 
sometimes, 
           not do any work on the project 
for  
           weeks 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW DISAGREE 
STRONGLY
DISAGREE 
Q62.   It looked at times as if the 
implementer 
          did not consider the effect of 
some of  
          its decisions on the community 
or the  
          environment 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q63.   The implementer did not 
appreciate  
           input from other people who 
has good 
1 2 9 3 4 
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           knowledge about establishing 
water 
           projects  
 
 COMPLETELY SOMEWHAT DON’T KNOW 
A 
LITTLE
NOT 
AT 
ALL 
Q64.   How much did you believe the 
           implementer would fulfil its 
promise to 
           you of providing water to the 
community 
           every day? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Male    1 Q65.   Gender of respondent 
Female    2 
 
Black African    1 
White    2 
Coloured    3 
Q66.   Ethnic group of respondent 
Indian    4 
 
18 – 19    1 
20 – 25    2 
26 – 30    3 
31 – 35    4 
36 – 40    5 
Q67.   Age group of respondent 
41+    6 
 
Q68.   Language of respondent 
English   1 Tswana   7 
Afrikaans   2 Tsonga / Shangaan   8 
Zulu   3 Venda   9 
Xhosa   4 Swazi   10 
North Sotho Pedi   5 Ndebele   11 
South Setho / Sesotho   6 Other (specify)   12 
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Appendix B 
IMPLEMENTER QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
F.   RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Q1.     What type of water provision was your institution responsible for? 
In-house water provision 1 
Standpipe every 200 metres 2 
Borehole 3 
Water reservoir 4 
Other (please specify) 5 
 
       YES          NO 
Q2.     Has the above-mentioned provision taken place?         1           0 
IF YES, go to Q3. IF NO, go to 4.  
 
 1 – 12 
MONTHS
1 – 2  
YEARS 
DON’T 
KNOW 
2 – 3 
YEARS 
LONGER
(Specify)
Q3.   How long has the water provision 
taken 
         place? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Mark the items your institution ensured in the project 
 STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW DISAGREE 
STRONGLY
DISAGREE 
Q4.     Providing water to the 
community 1 2 9 3 4 
Q5.     Providing water on an equal 
basis to 
           all members within the 
community 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q6.     Providing water 24h/7days a 
week 1 2 9 3 4 
Q7.     Establishing water 
infrastructure that 
           is in accordance with 
engineering 
           recommendations 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Q8.     Providing water for many years 1 2 9 3 4 
Q9.     Ensuring the water is safe for 
people 
           to drink and use 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q10.   The environment was not 
harmed 
           with the project being 
established 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q11.    Water is provided at an 
affordable 
            tariff 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Q12.    The project forms part of water 
           provision to the entire district 1 2 9 3 4 
Q13.   Your institution used partners in 
           order to establish the project 1 2 9 3 4 
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Q14.   The community was involved in 
the 
           project process 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q15.   The community was consulted 
about 
           the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q16.   Your institution was accessible 
to 
           the community for any 
           comments/ideas/concerns 
during and 
           after the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
 STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW DISAGREE 
STRONGLY
DISAGREE 
Q17.   Your institution welcomed new 
           ideas in order to successfully 
           established the project  
1 2 9 3 4 
      
Q18.   Your institution ensured the 
project 
           was established through good 
           governance 
1 2 9 3 4 
      
Q19.   Your institution was 
accountable in 
           the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
      
Q20.   Your institution provided 
information  
           about the project to the 
community 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q21.   Your institution exhibited 
openness 
           about its actions, behaviour 
and 
           decisions in the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
       YES          NO 
Q22.     Did the community start getting water on the date promised to 
them? 
 
        1           0 
 
 DID 
NOT 
WAIT 
1 -3 
MONTHS
DON’T 
KNOW 
3 – 6  
MONTHS LONGER
Q23.   How long did the community have to 
wait 
           for water access after the project 
was 
           established? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 1 – 12 
MONTHS
1 - 2 
YEARS 
DON’T 
KNOW 
2 – 3 
YEARS 
LONGER
(Specify)
Q24.   Since starting to receive water, for 
how 
           long after did the community continue 
to 
           receive water? 
1 2 9 3 4 
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 LESS THAN 
2 DAYS A 
WEEK 
2 – 4 DAYS 
A WEEK 
DON’T 
KNOW 
4 – 6 
DAYS A 
WEEK 
7 DAYS 
PER 
WEEK 
Q25.   For how long does the 
           community have access to 
           water each week? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 MET IT 
FULLY 
MET MOST 
OF IT 
DON’T 
KNOW 
MET PART 
OF IT 
DID NOT 
MEET IT AT 
ALL 
Q26.   How well do you think your 
           institution met its 
responsibility 
           to the community? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
 
G.   INFORMATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Mark the type of information that was made available to you by your institution about the water 
project (you can mark as many as you are sure of). 
 
 STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW DISAGREE 
STRONGLY
DISAGREE 
Q27.   Information about the type 
          (standpipes/in-house/other) of 
water 
           provision 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q28.   Information about how this 
water 
           provision will take place 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q29.   Information about how the 
project 
          “turned out” 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q30.   Information about the persons 
from  
           your institution involved in the 
project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q31.   You know who the person is 
who 
           keeps communication open 
between 
           the community and your 
institution 
           with regards to this project 
(contact  
           person) 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q32.    If there is a maintenance 
problem 
           with a number of households’ 
water 
           provision, the community can 
contact 
           someone from your institution 
in order 
           to solve the problem 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q33.    Your institution communicated 
to 
            The community whether they 
will 
            need to pay water tariffs in 
1 2 9 3 4 
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 STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW DISAGREE 
STRONGLY
DISAGREE 
order for 
            maintenance in this water 
project 
Q34.     Other 
 1 2 9 3 4 
 
Information about all aspects of the project 
was made available 1 
Enough information was made available to 
the community 2 
Don’t Know 3 
Information which the community needed to 
know was withheld; which may, for example 
impact the security of the institution 
4 
Q35.   Please indicate the amount of 
           information made available to the 
           community about the water project 
Only information that we felt the community 
wanted to know was made available  5 
 
Q36.     Please mark the methods used by make the information about the project available to the
            community 
Community meeting         1 
Pamphlets         2 
Notices in local newspaper         3 
Announcements made by the contact person         4 
Discussion forums with the implementer         5 
Project reports         6 
People from the implementer going from door-to-door to talk about the project         7 
Other (please specify)         8 
None         9 
 BIG IMPACT 
SOME 
IMPACT
DON’T 
KNOW 
SMALL 
IMPACT
NO 
IMPACT 
Q37.   What impact did the amount of 
information 
           made available to the community 
have on 
           how the water project “turned out”? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Q38.   Why do you say this? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
H.   INCLUSION, ENGAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 VERY MOSTL DON’T SOMEWHAT NOT AT ALL 
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USEFU
L 
Y 
USEFU
L 
KNOW USEFUL USEFUL 
Q39.   Indicate how useful the 
suggestions 
           the community communicated 
to 
           you were 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Q40.     Please mark the ways in which you/your institution kept contact with the community 
Discussion forums         1 
Community meetings         2 
Contact person(s)         3 
Project reports (information about how the project is progressing)         4 
Feedback forms (the institution asking you how you perceive the project’s development)         5 
Translator         6 
Your institution made an effort to assist illiterate people so that they too could be part of w
was happening in the project 
        7 
Everyone in the community was able to be part of the process (for example, both men and
women were included in community meetings) 
        8 
The community could vote about suggestions made about the project         9 
The community could veto or reject suggestions to show disagreement with suggestions        10 
 
Q41.   Looking at Q40s answer(s), please   
           indicate the number of times this 
           method was used 
1 – 3 
TIMES 
4 – 6 
TIMES
DON’T 
KNOW 
MORE THEN 
6 TIMES NEVER
Discussion forums 1 2 9 3 4 
Community meetings 1 2 9 3 4 
Contact person(s) 1 2 9 3 4 
Project reports (information about how the 
project  
is progressing) 
1 2 9 3 4 
Feedback forms (the institution asking you how
you perceive the project’s development) 1 2 9 3 4 
Translator 1 2 9 3 4 
Your institution made an effort to assist illiterat
people so that they too could be part of what w
happening in the project 
1 2 9 3 4 
Everyone in the community was able to be par
of  
the process (for example, both men and wome
were included in community meetings) 
1 2 9 3 4 
The community could vote about suggestions 
made about the project 1 2 9 3 4 
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Q41.   Looking at Q40s answer(s), please   
           indicate the number of times this 
           method was used 
1 – 3 
TIMES 
4 – 6 
TIMES
DON’T 
KNOW 
MORE THEN 
6 TIMES NEVER
The community could veto or reject suggestion
to show disagreement with suggestions 1 2 9 3 4 
 
 1 – 6 MONTHS 
6 – 12 
MONTHS 
DON’T 
KNOW
12 – 18 
MONTHS 
MORE 
THAN 18 
MONTHS 
Q42.   How long did it take to complete 
the 
           project? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
AT 
ANY 
TIME 
MOST 
OF THE 
TIME 
DON’T 
KNOW SOMETIMES NEVER
Q43.   When was the community able to 
           contribute their ideas about the 
project? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
Let us say that being included in the project process means your institution kept continuous contact with 
the community in order to make sure it took their needs and interests into consideration. Keeping this 
definition of being included in mind, please answer the following question. 
 
 THROUGHOUTPROJECT 
FOR 
MOST OF 
PROJECT
DON’T 
KNOW 
PART OF 
PROJECT 
NOT 
INCLUDED
Q44.   To what degree did you 
feel the 
           community were included 
in the 
           project process? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
I.   SANCTIONING AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 YES NO 
Q45.   Was there ever in the project process a time when the community 
wanted the 
           project to be stopped because they believed there was a serious issue 
to be 
           resolved before continuing? 
1 0 
IF YES, go to Q46. IF NO, go to Q51. 
 
 
Q46.   What was the issue about? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
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 YES NO 
Q47.   Was the project stopped for a time? 1 0 
IF YES, go to Q48. IF NO, go to Q51. 
 
Q48.     Who stopped the project? 
The community         1 
The implementer         2 
The engineering contractor         3 
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry         4 
Other (please specify)         5 
      
 IMMEDIATELY 1 – 3 MONTHS
DON’T 
KNOW 
3 – 6 
MONTHS
LONGER
(Specify)
Q49.   How long after the issue was 
“voiced” 
           was the project stopped? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 YES NO 
Q50.   Was the issue resolved so that the project could continue? 1 0 
 
 
VER
Y 
EAS
Y 
RELATIVEL
Y EASY 
DON’T 
KNOW 
NOT 
THAT 
EASY 
DIFFICULT 
Q51.   How easy, would you say it is to 
bring a 
           project to a halt in order to resolve 
an 
           issue? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 YES NO 
Q52.   The community does not always have all the necessary facts.  Do you 
believe 
           that you might just as well have continued with the project while 
resolving the 
           issue at the same time? 
1 0 
 
Q53.     A project does not necessarily need to be stopped because: 
Halting the project would mean losing money         1 
The issue, most of the time, is not important         2 
The project gets behind schedule         3 
The issue can be resolved while the project continues         4 
Other (please specify)         5 
 
 
 YES NO 
Q54.   Did anyone lose their job because implementation (for example, water 
pipers 
           were laid too shallow) was not up to standard? 
1 0 
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J.   CREDIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 YES NO 
Q55.   Do you still have contact with the community where the project was 
           implemented? 1 0 
IF YES, go to Q56. IF NO, go to Q61. 
 
Q56.   Through whom is this contact maintained? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 YES NO 
Q57.   Has this person(s) contacted you about something related to the 
project after 
           its completion? 
1 0 
IF YES, go to Q58. IF NO, go to Q61. 
 
Q58.   What was it about? 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 YES NO 
Q59.   Were you able to assist this person(s)? 1 0 
IF YES, go to Q61. IF NO, go to Q60. 
 
Q60.     Why could you/your institution not assist this person(s)? 
The institution is not responsible for the issue the person contacted us about         1 
There is not enough resources available to respond to the issue the person contacted us 
about (specify what resource is not available: money, people or skills) 
        2 
The institution is currently busy with other projects and do not have the time to spare to lo
into  
this issue at present but will do so in the future 
        3 
It is beneficial for the community to resolve this issue themselves so they will be able to lo
after  
the project 
        4 
 
 1 – 3 MONTHS
3 – 6 
MONTHS
DON’T 
KNOW 
6 – 12 
MONTHS
LONGER
(Specify)
Q61.   How long have you been involved in  
           establishing projects of this size? 1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
 
 
Please mark the characteristics the your institution embodies during a project  
 STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
DON’T 
KNOW DISAGREE 
STRONGLY
DISAGREE 
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Q62.   Show interest in the beneficiaries
           needs 1 2 9 3 4 
Q63.   Work hard to finish the project 1 2 9 3 4 
Q64.   Possess knowledge in how to  
           establish the project 1 2 9 3 4 
Q65.   Make the project a priority in the
           Institution’s operations 1 2 9 3 4 
Q66.   Think ahead about possible 
           consequences for each decision 
and/ 
           or action 
1 2 9 3 4 
Q67.   Consult other experts in order to
           successfully establish the project 1 2 9 3 4 
 
 COMPLETELY SOMEWHAT DON’T KNOW 
A 
LITTLE
NOT 
AT 
ALL 
Q68.   How much do you believe that 
your 
           institution fulfilled its promise of 
providing 
           water to the community every 
day? 
1 2 9 3 4 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
Male    1 Q69.   Gender of respondent 
Female    2 
 
Black African    1 
White    2 
Coloured    3 
Q70.   Ethnic group of respondent 
Indian    4 
 
18 – 19    1 
20 – 25    2 
26 – 30    3 
31 – 35    4 
36 – 40    5 
Q71.   Age group of respondent 
41+    6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q72.   Level of Education of respondent Primary school    1 
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High school (Grade 10)    2 
Matric    3 
Diploma (specify) 
 
………………………………………
   4 
Tertiary (specify) 
 
………………………………………
   5 
Other (specify) 
 
………………………………………
   6 
 
Q73.   Language of respondent 
English   1 Tswana   7 
Afrikaans   2 Tsonga / Shangaan   8 
Zulu   3 Venda   9 
Xhosa   4 Swazi   10 
North Sotho Pedi   5 Ndebele   11 
South Setho / Sesotho   6 Other (specify)   12 
 
Q74.   Position within the implementing institution? (Optional) 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 126
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
